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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years, the number of persons communicating via the
Internet,' sometimes referred to as cyberspace, 2 has soared.3 Along with the ease
1. See infra Part II (discussing the Internet).
2. This term was created by William Gibson in his novel "Neuromancer." EDWARD A. CAVAZOS &
GAVINO MORIN, CYBERSPACE AND THE LAW: YOUR RIGHTS AM DrmEs IN THE ON-LINE WORLD I (1994). The
concept encompassed a link connecting the human brain to a computer in order to give one the illusion of
physical presence in an information "matrix" from which one could gather information. Id. See Laurence A.
Tribe, The Constitution in Cyberspace: Lnv and Liberty Beyond the Electronic Frontier (visited Oct. 1995 and
on file with The Transnational Lawyer) < http:llwww.io.coml/ss/Tribe.html> (describing "cyberspace" as a
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of communicating with people in various countries and continents comes the
ability to cause serious damage to the reputation of the subject of the communi-
cation.4 Defamation 5 on the Internet can occur through electronic mail messages,
publication of a World Wide Web (WWW) page, or through communications in
discussion groups.6 Due to a recent influx of law suits stemming from defamatory
statements communicated via the Internet,7 many legal issues impacting the
place "where voice-mail and e-mail messages are stored and sent back and forth, and where computer-
generated graphics are transmitted and transformed, all in the form of interactions, some real-time and some
delayed, among countless users, and between users and the computer itself[.]"); HowARD RHEINGOLD, THE
VIRTUAL CoMMuNIrY: HOMESTEADING THE ELECTONIC FRONTIER 5 (1993) (explaining "cyberspace"as a
world created by the "words, human relationships, data, wealth, and power... by people using [computer-
mediated communications]."); see also infra notes 26-50 (providing the components of the Internet); ACLU
v. Reno, 929 F.Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (viewing cyberspace as a "decentralized, global medium of
communications" linking people worldwide).
3. See CAVAZOS & MORIN, supra note 2, at 9-10 (explaining how the dimensions of the Internet
expand daily as new systems go on-line and that although exact numbers are unknown, it is estimated that
millions of people are interacting at a given time). As of the end of 1995, there were 55,000,000 users on the
Intemet, worldwide. World Wide Web User Statistics (visited Sept. 28, 1996 and on file at The Transnational
Lawyer) <http:llwww.why-not.comlcompany/stats.htm>. This number doubles every nine months, with the
expectation that 80% of the world population will be on-line by the year 2000. Id. But see Internet
Demographics (visited Oct. 6, 1996 and on file with The Transnational Lawyer) <http:llwww.bltg.comJ
demograf.html> (providing that there is no way to measure the growth of the Internet). Since no single entity
controls the Internet, exact statistics are unknown; thus surveys are used for estimations. Id. The number of
host systems, i.e. computers directly connected to the Internet, was 9,500,000 as of January 1996. Il As of July
1996, there were 3,054 Internet Service Providers worldwide. Id. See Yahoo! Business and
Economy: Companies: ... Internet Access Providers (visited Sept. 29, 1996 and on file with The Transnational
Lawyer) <http://www.yahoo.com Business._and._Economy... ntemet_AccessProviders/ NationalUS_/>
(providing a list of U.S. service providers providing access to the Intemet); Yahoo! Regional:Countries:United
Kingdom...Internet Access Providers (visited Sept. 29, 1996 and on file with the Transnational Lawyer)
<http://www.yahoo.com/ Regional/Countries/U...ernet.ServicesflntemetAccess_ Providers/> (listing U.K.
service providers providing access to the Internet).
4. See CAVAZOS & MoIN supra note 2, at 78 (finding that due to the ease and speed with which one
can spread a message across the world, there is great potential for damaging a person's reputation.) A single
communication questioning someone's character could reach countless individuals and do irreparable harm
to the subject's reputation. Id. See Nick Braithwaite, The Internet and Bulletin Board Defamation, 145 NEw
L.J. 678, 1216 (1995) (commenting on the global nature of communications over the Internet and how
defamation may occur in any country).
5. See infra Part III (defining defamation and providing the legal requirements for a cause of action
in England and the United States).
6. See CAVAZOS & MORIN, supra note 2, at 78 (providing that defamation on the Internet can occur
from various modes of communication on the Internet); infra notes 26-50 and accompanying text (addressing
certain tools for communicating on the Intemet); infra note 7 (discussing the various law suits stemming from
defamatory Internet communication made on newsgroups and bulletin board systems).
7. See Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 138 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (addressing the issue
of whether an owner and operator of an electronic bulletin board should be liable for defamatory statements
posted on their bulletin boards). The judge held that the on-line service was not liable for the statements posted
since CompuServe neither wrote nor edited the statement. Id. at 140. CompuServe was compared to a book
store which only distributes publications and thus has no duty to monitor the contents of the publications. Id.
at 39-40. But see Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 94-31063, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229,
at *10 (N.Y. Sup. May 24, 1995) (holding the on-line service provider liable since Prodigy prided itself on
controlling bulletin board content and has an editorial staff that monitored transmissions). The judge agreed
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Internet community, as well as the legal world, are surfacing. Crucial defamation
issues include: defining who is subject to liability and which standards to apply;8
that bulletin boards should be viewed as bookstores and libraries. Id. Bookstores and libraries are only liable
if they have a reason to know material is defamatory. Richard Raysman & Jeffrey D. Neuburger, On-line
Services-Could You Be Found Liable?, INFO. WK., Sept. 25, 1995, at 140. Since Prodigy made a deliberate
decision to gain the benefits of editorial control, it put itself in the position of determining what is proper for
its members to post and read on the bulletin boards. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 N.Y.
Misc. LEXIS 229, at *10. Prodigy determined what was proper by using a program that prescreened messages
for obscenities and used its staff to enforce guidelines. Raysman & Neuburger, supra, at 140. Although on
appeal, the case was recently settled out of court. Elizabeth Corcoran, $200 Million Libel Suit Against Prodigy
Dropped, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1995, at F2. On October 24, 1995, the parties issued a joint press release
during which Prodigy apologized for the damage to Stratton Oakmont's reputation, and Stratton Oakmont
agreed not to oppose Prodigy's request to make a motion for summary judgement. Id. Prodigy filed a motion
to reargue the case which was denied on December 1I, 1995. MEDIA L.R. (BNA) No. 21, at 1126. 1127-28
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 11, 1995). The trial court issued an order not to vacate its earlier decision holding on-line
service providers liable when they exercise control over content. Id. See Tamburo v. Calvin, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3399 (Mar. 15, 1995) at *5-6. Tamburo involved individuals from different states, where one made
several defamatory statements about the other on a bulletin board available via Prodigy. Id. The judge held that
the plaintiff stated a claim for defamation, however leave to amend the complaint was granted so that the
plaintiff could establish actual damages over $50,000 in order to comport with requirements for subject matter
jurisdiction based on diversity. Id. at *41. See Rindos v. Hardwick, No. 940164 (W. Austi. Sup. Ct. Mar.
1994), (visited Oct. 23, 1995 and on file with The Transnational Lawyer) <http://Mark.law.auckland.ac.nz/
cases/Rindos.html>. The case concerned libel statements published on the DIALx science anthropology
computers bulletin board, an international computer news service used by universities world-wide; 23,000
people have access to the board. Id. The judge considered the statements distributed to "the World" to be
defamatory and awarded the plaintiff $40,000. Id. See Proposed UK Libel Law Poses Threat to Internet Service
Providers, FIN.TECH. 1ELEcOM MKTs, July 6, 1995, available in LEXIS, Cmpeom Library, Comm File
(discussing the first electronic libel case in England, between London lecturers Laurence Godfrey and nuclear
physicist Philip Hallan-Baker, regarding statements made on a conference server available to 16 million users).
The suit was settled out of court. Id. The messages were posted from Usenet labs in Germany and Switzerland
and the resulting suit was filed in England where libel laws are harsh. Litigation Libel on the Net, INFO. WK.,
Oct. 31, 1994, at 10, available in LEXIS, Cmpcom Library, Comm File. See Charles Wright & Lisa Mitchell,
Digital Defamation Risk in a Very Public Mail Service, THE AGE (Melbourne), April 6, 1993 (discussing the
American Medphone case, where Medphone sued Mr. DeNigris, a Prodigy user, for defamatory statements
posted on a bulletin which allegedly caused Medphone's stock prices to drop drastically); see also Jamie Prime,
Shallow Pockets: Libel Suit Against an Internet User, 82 THE QUIt.L, Oct. 1994, at 30, available in LEXIS
News Library, AsapII File (discussing a suit between Suarez Corp. Industries Inc. and Brock Meeks, where
the former sued the latter for calling the corporation a "cybersuckef' over the Internet and for $25,000 in legal
bills that thwarted Meeks financial ability to continue the legal fight). See generally Mike Godwin, What's
Important About the Medphone Libel Case?, (visited Oct. 1995 and available on file at The Transnational
Lawyer) <httpd/www.eff.org/pub/EFF/Newsletters/EFFector/effector5.05> (discussing the Medphone case).
8. See Internet Protection Proposed, 15 COMM. DAILY 118, June 20, 1995, at 1, available in LEXIS
Cmpcom Library, Comm File (discussing effects of Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy case, and FCC proposals
regarding liability of on-line service providers); see also Tenth Anniversary: ISA Convention Proves Showcase
for New Players, 15 COMM. DAILY, July 14, 1995, at 6, available in LEXIS Cmpcom Library, Comm File
(regarding suggestions by Prodigy's attorney that service providers exercise minimum control over content
while using contracts to require users to assume more of the risk for the content of their communications.);
Advertising in Cyberspace, 12 COMPtrR LAW., Sept. 1995, at I (questioning when an on-line service provider
is liable); Rex S. Heinke & Heather D. Rafter, Rough Justice in Cyberspace: Liability on the Electronic
Frontier, 11 COMPtrER LAw., July 1994, at 1, available in LEXIS Cmpcom Library, Cpllawr File (discussing
liability and analogizing to other media); New Law to Protect Net Firms From Libel Action: Originators to be
Responsible for Defamatory Material, COMPUTER WKLY., June 8, 1995, at 6, available via LEXIS News
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deter mining the place of publication;9 establishing what constitutes a
publication; t° determining how to maintain a cause of action against an
anonymous defamer; ascertaining which country's law applies;' 2 and deciding
whether an individual can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court of another
country based on a defamatory statement disseminated over the Internet.3
The jurisdictional problem of suing people for their activities over the
Internet, a medium recognizing no geographic boundaries, 4 is a growing concern
in light of the increase in defamation suits stemming from Internet communi-
cations. If the person being sued cannot be brought under the jurisdiction of
another country's court system, then that court will not be able to address the
issues raised by defamatory publications over the Internet.
5
The global nature of the Internet enables users to transmit communications
worldwide. When these communications are defamatory the responsible party
may be sued and held legally responsible. 6 Plaintiffs will want to bring suit
where the defamation laws are most favorable for them. England, a country with
defamation laws favoring plaintiffs, will be an obvious choice.' 7 Unlike the
United States, where the Constitution requires some degree of fault by the
Responsible for Defamatory Material, COMPUTER WKLY., June 8, 1995, at 6, available via LEXIS News
Library, AsapIl File (discussing the new British libel act known as "Defamation (Responsibility for
Publication) Bill").
9. See infra Part III (discussing required elements for a defamation action).
10. See infra Part III (discussing required elements for a defamation action).
11. See Interview with Alexander Kaplinsky, Vice President of USWeb NetWORKERS Web
Consulting, Inc. (Feb. 5, 1996) (explaining how individuals on the Internet can utilize anonymous remailers
to ensure the anonymity of their communications). At the time of publication, Mr. Kaplinsky could be
contacted via e-mail at alex@networkers.com or <http/h'www.networkers.com>.
12. See Charles Mann, Regulating Cyberspace, 268 SCIENCE, May 5, 1995, at 628, available in LEXIS
News Library, AsaplI File (discussing impossibility of obeying the laws of all countries in light of the
interconnectedness of the Internet); see also Mitch Betts & Gary H. Anthes, On-line Boundaries Unclear:
Internet Tramples Legal Jurisdictions, COMPUTER WORLD, June 5, 1995, at 1, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Cmpwld File (describing how harm occurs where the message is read). Since the message can be read
anywhere when communicating via the Internet, there is enormous potential for forum shopping. Id. See Jon
Weiner, Free Speech on the Internet, 258 THE NATION 23, June 13, 1994, at 23 (noting that it is easier to win
a libel suit in Australia than in the United States). See Braithwaite supra note 4, at 1216 (distinguishing U.S.
libel law from that in England); Litigation-Libel on the Net, supra note 7, at 10 (relating the potential to sue
in any country where the system has a user and addressing the existence of differences of libel law in various
countries).
13. See CAvAzOs &MORIN supra note 2, at 78 (citing Loftus E. Becker, Jr, The Liability of Computer
Bulletin Board Operatorsfor Defamation Posted by Others, 22 CONN. L. REV. 203 for the proposition that legal
scholars have spent more time analyzing and discussing on-line libel than most other legal issues posed by
Internet communications).
14. Unlike other forms of media, Internet speakers cannot limit the geographic scope of their
communications. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F.Supp. 824, 877 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
15. See infra Part IV (providing that in both the United States and England, the courts must have
jurisdiction over the parties in order to hear the suit); supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text (describing other
legal issues involved with defamation on the Internet).
16. See infra Part IV (discussing liability for defamatory communications).
17. See iufra notes 54-87 and accompanying text (discussing English libel law).
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defendant, England does not require a plaintiff to prove fault to maintain a defam-
ation cause action.' 8 This comment focuses on the libel aspect of defamation larP
in England and the United States as it affects private individuals on the Internet.2"
Part II provides a description of the Internet and the protocols by which one may
communicate in that medium.2' Part III provides a brief description and
comparison of current libel law 2 in England and the United States. With this
framework in place, Part IV examines the requirements necessary to bring a
foreign defendant into a U.S. court for a libel suit as well as the requirements for
bringing a foreign defendant into an English &ourt.24 Part V concludes with a dis-
cussion of the problems inherent in applying traditional jurisdictional principles
based on geographic boundaries to communications on the Internet where geo-
graphic location is irrelevant, and offers four proposals addressing these
problems. 25
II. THE INTERNET
A. Defined
The Internet is a matrix of interconnected networks of computers.26 A user's
computer connects to other computers via analog or digital lines, including but
not limited to, conventional phone lines.27 Once this connection is complete, the
18. See infra notes 111-193 and accompanying text (comparing English and U.S. libel law).
19. See CAVAZOs & MORIN, supra note 2, at 78 (stating that defamation over the Internet is classified
as libel).
20. See Kimberly Richards, Comment, Defamation via Modern Communications: Can Countries
Preserve Their Traditional Policies?, 3 TRANSNAT'L LAW.3 at 613 (1990), for a discussion on defamation law
as it applies to public figures.
21. SeeinfraPartll.
22. Slander refers to spoken messages while libel refers to those which are written. W. PAGE KEETON
Er AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §112, at 785 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER &
KEErON]. Defamation will probably always be considered libel on the Internet. CAVAZOS & MORIN, supra note
2 at 78.
23. See infra Part III (examining defamation law in England and the United States).
24. See infra Part IV (discussing jurisdiction over foreign defendants).
25. See infra notes 264-69 and 320-64 and accompanying text (illustrating the difficulties of applying
jurisdictional principles to the Internet). Normally with torts, the suit is filed where the tort occurred or the
place of defendant's residence. Rosalind Resnick, Cybertort: The New Era, NAT. L.J., July 18, 1994, at Al.
Attorneys recognize that the problem with the Internet is that there is no physical place. Id. A suit could be filed
potentially anywhere the network touches. Id.
26. See ILC Glossary ofInternet Terms, (visited Oct. 5, 1996 and on file with The Transnational
Lawyer) <http'//www.matisse.net/files/glossary.html> [hereinafter ILC Glossary] (defining the Internet as a
collection of interconnected computer networks. Networks are a connection of two or more computers sharing
resources. Id. As of July 1995, the Internet connected about 60,000 networks into a worldwide internet. Id.
Internet, spelled with a lower case "I," refers to a connection of two or more networks. Id.
27. Interview with Alexander Kaplinsky, Vice President of USWeb NetWORKERS Web Consulting,
Inc. (Mar. 1, 1996). At the time of publication, Mr. Kaplinsky could be contacted via e-mail at
alex@networkers.com or <http//:wwv.networkers.com>.
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individual user's computer is linked to what is known as a "host system."' ' This
host is, in turn, linked to multiple other hosts containing a vast array of different
forms of information. 29
Though the Internet refers to many different networks and network protocols,
for purposes of this comment, the World Wide Web (WWW), discussion groups,
and electronic mail (e-mail) constitute the Internet.30 Use of these protocols allow
a moderately sophisticated user to disseminate written or graphic information to
multiple users worldwide.3
B. Modes of Communication on the Internet
1. The World Wide Web (WWW or The Web)
The fastest growing region of the Internet is the WWW.32 Web browser
software allows the user to access Internet sites which contain a vast array of
information such as corporate reports, sport scores, individuals' private vacation
pictures and newsletters about various topics.
33
28. CAVAZOS & MORIN, supra note 2, at 1-2. "Host" refers to any computer on a network that houses
services for use by other computers on the network. Id. One host machine often provides several services like
WWW and USENET. idt See infra notes 32-37 and 42-50 and accompanying text (discussing the WWW and
USENET).
29. Kaplinsky, supra note 27. Examples of information contained on hosts include: company
information, advertisements, and databases. Id.
30. See infra notes 32-50 and accompanying text (discussing the World Wide Web, discussion groups
and electronic mail).
31. Kaplinsky, supra note 27. Other protocols include gopher & ftp. Id. See ILC Glossary, supra note
26, for a definition of these protocols. Geographic separation is irrelevant to the speed with which information
travels; a message takes only seconds to travel around the world. Kaplinsky, supra note 27. With the push of
a button, electronic mail messages can be sent to millions of worldwide users simultaneously, thus providing
people the power to become their own instant multinational publisher. Id.
32. Kaplinsky, supra note 27. See Webcrawler: Special-Web Size (visited Sept. 28, 1996 and on file
with The Transnational Lawyer) <http://webcrawler.com/WebCrawler/Facts/Size.html> (providing that as of
September 1996, the Web's size had increased six times over the past year, with most of the growth due to new
Web servers); <www.hotwired.com/wired/4.02.features/jobs.html> (visited Sept. 29, 1996 and on file with The
Transnational Lawyer) (commenting on the exponential growth of the WWW); ACLU v. Reno, 929 F.Supp.
824, 836 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (referring to the WWW as the most well-known method of communicating on the
Internet). The WWW project, started by the European Laboratory for Particle Physics (CERN), strives to build
a distributed hypermedia system. <http:llwww.w3.orglpub/www/www> (visited on Sept. 29, 1996). The
advantage of hypertext is that in a hypertext document, if a user wants more information about a particular
topic mentioned, he or she can usually "just click on it" to obtain further detail. Kaplinsky, supra note 27. In
fact, documents by different authors can be and often are linked together; this is similar to footnoting, but the
document can be retrieved immediately. Id. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 835-36 (providing an in depth
discussion of the technical nature of the WWW).
33. Kaplinsky, supra note 27. A browser is a software program used for looking at Internet resources.
ILC Glossary, supra note 26. Examples of browsers include Netscape and Mosaic. Id. See id. (elaborating on
Netscape and Mosaic).
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It is becoming easier for people to publish their own Web sites.a4 Many on-
line providers35 allow subscribers to host personal Web pages.36  The ease of
setting up and the low cost of maintaining a Web page enables almost anyone to
publish communications instantly accessible to millions of users throughout the
world.37
2. Electronic Mail (E-Mail)
Electronic mail enables individuals to send and receive electronic messages
by way of a computer network.3 8 This permits mass communication to a wide
variety of users.39 The ability to send a message to thousands of people with little
effort opens up the user's potential risk of being legally responsible for spreading
defamatory statements wherever they are published, which can be anywhere in
the world.40
3. Discussion Groups
A "message base" is a place where written communications can be posted"
for viewing by subscribers.42 With the help of networking, subscribers to one
service can enter another service, thus enabling subscribers to connect with
34. Kaplinsky, supra note 27. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 836 (recognizing the ease of Web
publishing). Thousands of individuals publish their own personal Web pages. Id.
35. On-line service providers provide Internet access for their subscribers. Kaplinsky, supra note 27.
See CAVAZOS & MORIN, supra note 2, at 2 (defining on-line service providers as large computers housing
thousands of users at once); see Yahoo!: Business and Economy:Companies:Internet Services:Internet Access
Providers: National (U.S.), supra note 3 <http.//www.yahoo.com/Business..and.Economy... ntemet_Access_
Providers/NationaLU._S._/> (providing a list of U.S. on-line service providers); see Yahoo!:Regional:
Countries: United Kingdom:Business and Economy: Companies:Internet Services:Internet Access Providers,
supra note 3 (listing U.K. on-line service providers).
36. Kaplinsky, supra note 27.
37. Kaplinsky, supra note 27.
38. ILC Glossary, supra note 26. All users receive an address and user name so that mail can be
addressed and sent to one's personal electronic mail box. CAVAZOS & MORIN, supra note 2, at 5. A message
remains in the user's mailbox until the user logs on and reads the message and deletes, stores, or reroutes the
message to other users. Kaplinsky, supra note 27. By use of a mailing list, individuals can send e-mail to one
address, upon where their communication is copied and sent to any other subscribers of the mail list. ILC
Glossary, supra note 26.
39. ILC Glossary, supra note 26.
40. See infra note 217 and accompanying text (discussing how the tort of defamation occurs where the
statement is published, i.e., where it is read by third parties). Because a message can be sent to thousands of
people at once in various parts of the world, it can therefore be read in many countries at once, meaning that
the tort is occurring simultaneously all over the world. Id.
41. Posting is the method by which single messages are entered into a computer communications
system. ILC Glossary, supra note 26.
42. CAVAZOS & MORIN, supra note 2, at 6. This is similar to graffiti on bathroom walls where different
people comment on a particular subject. Id. USENET newsgroups allow anyone to become a subscriber, thus
for all purposes the messages are open for viewing by the public. Kaplinsky, supra note 27.
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people from various countries and continents.43 In some systems, messages are
sent to a central area where a moderator scans them for content.44 Other systems,
such as USENET, 45 a worldwide system of discussion groups known as news-
groups,46 do not scan or moderate message content. 47 Users can post a message
to a newsgroup which will be communicated to other newsgroup users around the
world; users are forewarned that they are posting their message globally.4 8
Because the numerous public message systems remain ungoverned, 49the potential
for widespread defamation looms large5 °
III. CURRENT DEFAMATION LAW IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES
Few people doubt individuals are legally responsible for what they say over
the Internet and can be sued for libel.5' If service providers exercise control over
43. Kaplinsky, supra note 27. Most on-line service providers provide access to USENET newgroups.
Id.
44. Kaplinsky, supra note 27.
45. See ILC Glossary, supra note 26 (describing USENET as a global system of discussion groups).
46. See ILC Glossary, supra note 26 (providing that newsgroups are the discussion groups found in
USENET).
47. See CAvAzos & MoPiN, supra note 2, at 6 (stating that USENET does not scan for message
content). See ILC Glossary, supra note 26 (defining USENET as a world-wide system of discussion groups,
with messages passed among hundreds of thousands of computers). There are over 10,000 discussion groups
called newsgroups. Id. Newsgroups are normally organized according to subject matter. Kaplinsky, supra note
27. See USENET Posting Tips, which pops up on a user's screen whenever the user tries to post or respond to
a message on USENET (advising that the user should only post to newsgroups best suiting the subject matter
of their communication since USENET is organized by subject). See e.g. Yahoo!-News: Usenet:Public Access
Usenet Sites (visited on Sept. 29, 1996 and on file with The Transnational Lawyer)
<http:llwww.yahoo.comlNewslUsenetlPublic-AccessUsenetSites9> (providing the option to view a list of
newsgroups).
48. See USENET Posting Tips, supra note 47 (asking senders of communications to USENET "Are
you sure you want to post your message to thousands of computer systems around the world?"). The user may
choose "yes" or "no." Id.
49. See e.g., About Netcom (visited Sept. 28, 1996 and on file with the Transnational Lawyer)
<http://www.netcom.com/about/protectcopy.html> (stating that NETCOM does not control the content of
newsgroup communications, but rather acts as a conduit transferring the information between USENET servers
and users); see also Yahoo! -News: Usenet:Public Access Usenet Sites, supra note 47 (providing the option
to view a list of uncensored news servers).
50. It can be inferred that if the messages are not scanned for content, the likelihood of defamatory
statements getting through is greater. This result should be balanced against the interests of service providers,
at least in the United States, who, by monitoring content, subject themselves to greater liability. See supra note
7 (discussing the Prodigy case). When on-line discussions involve personal attacks against the participants,
aflame war has erupted. ILC Glossary, supra note 26. "Flame" refers to any kind of derogatory comment. Id.
51. See Jon Weiner, supra note 12, at 23 (discussing the Australian case of Rindos v. Hardwick where
an individual was held responsible for his words communicated via the Internet); see also Glenn Groenewold,
The Net Meets the Law: The Legalities of Information Transmission: Rules of the Game, 12 UNIX REV., Dec.
1994, at 79, available in LEXIS News Library, AsapIl File (stating that individuals can be sued provided their
identity is ascertained); Proposed UK Libel Law Poses Threat to Internet Service Providers, supra note 7
(noting the first Internet libel suit in the UK, which was between two individuals); Richard Shilito & Oswald
Hickson Coller, Making Bones of Sticks and Stones--a Revolution in Computerized Publications Libel and
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content, then under current law, they will be held liable as publishers of
defamatory material.52 In the United States, distribution of a defamatory statement
through an on-line service is considered publication of the statement for purposes
of libel law 53 and the retransmittal of a statement by another person appears to
be a republicationi 4 This section focuses briefly 5 on what constitutes a
defamatory statement, libel, the requisite elements in a cause of action, and the
requirements for publication and republication.
A. England
1. Introduction
In England, a statement constitutes libel if it is in writing or some other per-
manent form.56 In a libel cause of action, the plaintiff has the burden of proving
three elements: (1) that the statement complained of is defamatory; (2) refers to
the plaintiff; and (3) has been published to a third party.57 Two presumptions exist
in favor of the plaintiff. The first is that the allegedly defamatory statement is un-
Slander Cases and the Reluctance to Inform Juries of Awards Reassessed by the Court of Appeal, 91 L.SOC.
GAzErTE, Oct. 19, 1994, at 20, available in LEXIS Ukjnl Library, Alljnl File (addressing the Australian case
of Rindos v. Hardwick as well as the first Internet libel suit in the UK, both of which involved individuals);
Wright & Mitchell, supra note 7 (discussing Suarez Corp. v. Meeks, an Internet libel suit against an individual
which was settled out of court). One can transmit his statements to a host in Finland which will then retransmit
the statements to the speaker's desired destination under an anonymous identifier. Kaplinsky, supra note 27.
In such a situation, the defamer would be unidentifiable. Id.
52. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229, at *10. See Braithwaite,
supra note 4 at 1216 (distinguishing those service providers who are liable for defamation from those who are
not based on whether they exercise editorial control over content); see also Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc.,
776 F. Supp. 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (treating service providers who don't know, nor have reason to know
of defamatory publications, as non liable distributors). CompuServe is viewed basically as a library with access
to publications for a fee. Id.
53. Advertising in Cyberspacesupra note 8, at I (explaining how anyone connected to the Internet who
accesses a statement can retransmit it instantaneously to other people absent awareness or permission by the
original publisher). Even if the original publisher removed her statement immediately, there is no guarantee
the statement won't be republished globally to others. Id. See infra note 155 and accompanying text (discussing
republication under U.S. law); see infra note 72 and accompanying text (addressing republication under
English law).
54. Advertising in Cyberspace, supra note 8, at 1.
55. This comment focuses on jurisdiction to adjudicate a case, thus the other areas are brief.
56. PETER F. CARTER-RUCK, LIBEL AND SLANDER 49 (1973); see Proposed UK Libel Law Poses Threat
to Internet Service Providers, supra note 7 (discussing the first electronic libel case in England stemming from
statements made in an on-line discussion group). This illustrates that writing of an electronic nature constitutes
libel. Id.
57. CARTER-RuCK, supra note 56, at 50.
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true. The second is that the plaintiff has suffered damage as a result of the
statement.58
2. The Statement Must be Defamatory
The first element a plaintiff must prove in a libel cause of action, is that the
statement complained of is defamatory.59 A statement must affect a person's
reputation in order to be defamatory. ° Plaintiffs only need to show that the
statement complained of tends to defame them; it is not necessary that those who
received the statement in fact think less of them.61 The standard is whether the
58. CARTER-ROCK, supra note 56, at 50. The defendant has the burden of repudiating these
presumptions, i.e. the defendant must prove the truth of the statement as well as lack of damages. Id.
Furthermore, the defendant's intent when making the statement is irrelevant unless she relies on the
unintentional defamation defense in § 4 of the Defamation Act of 1952. See infra note 85 and accompanying
text (relaying the necessary requisites for a defense based on unintentional defamation).
59. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (listing the plaintiff's burden of proof in a defamation
suit).
60. CARTER-RuCK, supra note 56, at 53. For example, assume that a newspaper article states, without
proper foundation, that a business person ceased engaging in that business. This may yield great financial loss,
but it does not suggest the person is unqualified for the profession or affect the person's reputation and thus
does not give rise to a defamation action. Id. The standard applied is whether the statement tends to yield a
negative impression in the minds of fair and reasonable persons whose standard of opinion is one the law will
recognize). Id. at 54. See Scott v. Sampson, [1882] 8 Q.B.D. 491,503 (providing that a statement is considered
defamatory if it tends to lower a person in the eyes of right thinking members of society). To be libelous, the
words must reduce the plaintiff's reputation among all right thinking people, not just a section of the
community. Byme v. Deane, [1937] 1 K.B. 818,2 All E.R. 204,206. The United States differs with regards
to size of the group considered. See, e.g., Byrne v. Deane, [1937] 1 K.B. 818, 2 All E.R. at 206-07
(proclaiming that it is not defamatory to say of a club member that he provided information to the police which
lead to the conviction of club officials, since there is a presumption that all citizens will aid in upholding the
law). See CARTER-RUCK, supra note 56, at51 (stating that a statement is defamatory if it causes people to avoid
the subject of the statement, or subjects them to hate, ridicule, or contempt, or which tends to discredit them
in their line of business). The tendency of a statement to harm persons in their trade or business is clear where
the statement discredits them by stating that they are dishonest or says that they lack a quality pertinent to the
trade or business in which she is engaged. CARTER-RUCK, supra note 54, at 52. For example if one states to
a third party that a specific attorney does not know the law, this would tend to discredit the attorney in her
practice by essentially saying that she is unqualified, and thus the statement would constitute libel. Id. In
addition, allegations of financial hardship about certain persons in business have been viewed as libelous since
financial ability is essential for running a business. See Jones v. Jones [1916] 2 A.C. 481, 507 (providing the
judgment of Lord Wrenbury). The standard used in the trade or business context is whether the statements
discredit the plaintiff, while considering the particular trade, business, or profession at issue. Id. at 507-509.
In Drummond-Jackson v. British Med. Ass'n, [1970] 1 All E.R. 1094 (regarding a published article criticizing
a technique developed by the plaintiff, a dental surgeon, and stating that the technique was detrimental and
even fatal in some cases). The court denied defendant's application to strike plaintiff's claim as stating no cause
of action since the article was capable of bearing a defamatory meaning and it's up to the jury to decide if
attack on the technique involves an attack on the plaintiff's reputation. Id.
61. CARTER-RUCK, supra note 56, at 51. In fact, a person can be defamed even though receivers know
the statement is untrue. Id.
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statement would reflect badly on the plaintiff in the eyes of reasonable, fair
persons.62
In determining the meaning of the words in an allegedly libelous statement,
the standard is whether a reasonable person reading it would find it defamatory
to the plaintiff.63 The reasonable person is permitted to consider the circumstances
surrounding the publication and to draw inferences from them.64 For example, in
a lawsuit against an English newspaper, an English court allowed the jury to con-
sider such circumstances as the prominence given to the item by the newspaper,
the use of bold type for the article title and the popularity of the newspaper.65
3. Identification
The second element a plaintiff must establish to meet the burden of proof for
libel is that the statement complained of refers to the plaintiff.6 The test is
62. CARTER-RUCK, supra note 56, at 51.
63. Lewis v. Daily Tel. Ltd., [1963] 2 All E.R. 151, 154. The defendant's intended meaning is
irrelevant. Id. When the words are capable of conveying several possible meanings, the judge decides as a
matter of law whether the words can possible bear the defamatory connotation the plaintiff alleges. Id. The test
is whether a reasonable person would comprehend the words in the same manner as the plaintiff believes them
to convey. CARTER-RucK, supra note 56, at 57. See Hart v. Wall, [1877] 2 C.P.D. 146, 149 (ruling where words
are capable of two meanings, only one of which is defamatory, the jury determines the manner in which the
words were used). But see Capital & Counties Bank -'. Henty, [1880] 5 C.P.D. 514, 541 (stating where there
are several viable interpretations of the words in issue, it is unreasonable to focus on the unfavorable
interpretation). Before the Defamation Act of 1952, a person using innuendo could be defenseless in a legal
action when some words might be considered defamatory. CARTER-RUCK, supra note 56, at 58. Since the
Defamation Act of 1952, a plaintiff desiring to rely on a hidden meaning must follow the requirements in order
82, rule 3(1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court. Id. The plaintiff pleading an innuendo must specify all facts
and circumstances that support his allegation in a separate paragraph of the claim. 1 THE SUPREME COURT
PRACTCE 1321 (Sir Jack I.H. Jacob et al. eds., 1991). If only persons with special knowledge of the
circumstances understand the defamatory meaning of the words, then plaintiffs must provide particulars of
these persons and circumstances in their statements of claim. Fullam v. Newcastle Chronicle & Journal Ltd.,
[1977] 3 All E.R. 32, 35 (C.A.). When the words involve slang or are of a foreign language, and there is doubt
as to their meaning, the plaintiff should plead an innuendo to ensure consideration of alleged meaning by the
judge. See CARTER-RUCK, supra note 54, at 58 (providing a case example where the judge refused to provide
the jury with a requested interpretation of a particular expression since the plaintiff failed to plead an innuendo
to that effect).
64. See CARTER-RUcK, supra note 56, at 56 (stating that the sting of a defamatory statement is often
the inferences to be drawn from the words); see e.g., Lewis v. Daily Tel. Ltd., [1963] 2 All E.R. at 154
(illustrating that it may not be libelous to say that a person's affairs were being inquired into, but specifying
that it is the City Fraud Squad making the inquiry is different). Id. The sting in this example comes from the
inference to be drawn from reference to the Fraud Squad. Id.
65. English & Scottish Co-op Properties Mortgage & Investment Society Ltd. v. Odhams Press Ltd.,
[194011 All E.R. 1, 4-7. The defendant newspaper wrote an article about court proceedings, entitling it "False
Profit Return Charge Against Society." Id. at 4. In determining the interpretation to be given to the words
'False Profit,' the court permitted the jury to consider circumstances such as the prominence given to the item
and the bold type used in the heading. Id. at 4-7.
66. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (listing the plaintiff's burden of proof in a defamation
suit). The plaintiff must state in his claim that the words can be reasonably interpreted as referring to him.
CARTER-RUCK, supra note 56, at 52-53. See Knupffeer v. London Express Newspaper Ltd., [944] 1 All E.R.
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whether the words used would reasonably lead persons acquainted with the
plaintiff to believe the plaintiff is the person to whom the words refer6 7
4. Publication
The final element of libel required of a plaintiff is proof that the complained
of statement has been published to a third party.6 8 Any persons involved in a
defamatory communication to a person, other than the defamed, can be found res-
ponsible for publishing a defamatory statement, no matter how insignificant he
is in the chain of command.69 The one exception to this rule is if persons accused
are able to establish themselves as an innocent disseminator of the information.7"
Furthermore, people who permit a defamatory statement to remain on premises
under their control may be liable for defamation.7! '
Original publishers of a libelous statement are liable if they authorize another
to republish the statement or if republication is the natural and probable result of
the original publication.
72
495, 498-99 (explaining the requirements for plaintiffs wanting to bring a cause of action on behalf of
themselves when the statement was written about a class of people). A member of a class cannot claim that the
statement was written about him unless: (1) the class is so small or so identifiable that what is said about the
class is necessarily said of every member, or (2) the words, under the circumstances involved, in fact refer to
a particular individual. Id. The factors considered in determining if reasonable persons would find the words
refer to the particular plaintiff are: (1) the size of the class; (2) the generality of the charge; and (3) the
extravagance of the accusation. Id. at 499.
67. Morgan v. Odhams Press Ltd., [1971] 2 All E.R. 1156, 1164-1165. Whether the defendant intended
to refer to the plaintiff is irrelevant. See Newstead v. London Express Newspaper Ltd. [1939] 4 All E.R. 319,
322 (specifying that if the jury finds that reasonable persons would have understood the words in question to
refer to the plaintiff, then the fact that the defendant intended the words to refer to and were true of another
person provides no defense).
68. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (listing the plaintiff's burdens of proof in a defamation
suit). The wrong in a libel case is not the writing of the words, but the communication of them to third parties.
CARTER-RuCK, supra note 56, at 76. This communication is termed "publication." Id. at 76.
69. See CARTER-RUCK, supra note 56, at 76 (maintaining that in regard to a book, those who have been
held liable include the publisher, author, printer, press operator and distributor).
70. See Annotated British. Commonwealth and European Cases, 32(1) THE DIGEsT §2352 at 242
(discussing Sun Life Assurance Company v. W.H. Smith and Son Ltd. [1934] 150 L.T.R. 211). The mere
distributor who is neither the author, printer nor original publisher of the statement cannot be held liable,
provided the court is satisfied that: (1) the defendant did not know the document at issue contained, nor was
likely to contain, a libelous statement, and (2) such ignorance had nothing to do with any lack of care on the
defendant's part. Id.
71. Byrne v. Deane, [1937] 2 All E.R. at 206-207 (stating that when proprietors of a club allow a
defamatory statement to remain on the wall of their club, they are in essence consenting to it remaining on the
wall).
72. Speight v. Gosnay, [1891] 60 Q.B. 231; see e.g., Parkes v. Prescott, [1869] 17 W.N. 775. This case
surrounded a board of guardians meeting in the presence of the press where statements were made against the
plaintiff. Id. Before the meeting, defendant chairman expressed his desire, and verbally approved of another
chairman's wish, that the press take notice of the specific scandal. Id. The press only printed what it was asked
to, and thus the defendant chairman, in a suit by the plaintiff, was held liable for the publication by the press.
Id.
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In certain cases, English law will presume a publication unless there is
evidence to the contrary. 73 Such a situation exists in the case of a postcard, which
by its nature is open for reading and understanding by anyone through whom it
passes in the normal course of the mail route.74 This presumption may be rebutted
with proof that no one other than the addressee read the postcard; however it is
virtually impossible to prove this.75
Every publication of libel provides a new cause of action.76 Thus, if a
defamatory statement is published in several newspapers, it is not a defense to
claim that a particular publication is merely repeating something already pub-
lished in another document. 7
5. Defenses
The following are primary defenses to defamation actions: justification, fair
comment, absolute privilege, qualified privilege, unintentional defamation and
apology with payment into the court.78
Justification is a complete bar to liability provided the defendant can prove
the allegedly defamatory words are true in fact and substance; 79 there is no justi-
fication for a statement because it is phrased in the form of opinion.8° However,
the defense of fair comment protects true expressions of opinion on matters of
public interest.8' Absolute privilege is provided for all statements and reports
73. CARTER-RUCK, supra note 56, at 79.
74. See Huth v. Huth, [1915] 3 K.B. 32, 39 (C.A.) (explaining that the court takes judicial notice of the
nature of the document, such as a postcard, and absent evidence to the contrary, presumes it has been read by
others); see also [1936] Sim v. Stretch, 2 All E.R. 1237 (noting that the law will presume publication when
one sends a telegram); Sadgrove v. Hole, [1901] 2 KB. 1, 306 (C.A.) (emphasizing that for the presumption
of publication to aid a plaintiff's case, there must be enough information to identify the plaintiff as the subject
referred to in the postcard).
75. See Huth v. Huth, 3 K.B. at 39 (stating that it is difficult to imagine that proof could be given to
show not a single person read the postcard).
76. CARTER-RUCK, supra note 56, at 80.
77. Id. at8l.
78. Id. at 105.
79. Id. at 105-106. See Wakely v. Cooke, [1849] 4 Ex. 511, 512-513 (illustrating the statement 'X is
a libelous journalist' can bejustified by proof thatjudgement was entered against the plaintiff in a libel action).
80. CARTER-RUCK, supra note 56, at 109-10 (providing if the statement is phrased as "I believe [X] is
a swindler," it is not sufficient to establish the statement as true belief). The defendant must prove that the
statement is true in fact for a defense based on justification. Id.
81. See id. at 117 (explaining it is a complete defense when words are "fair comment made in good faith
and without malice on a matter of public interest"). This defense is available for individuals as well as
newspapers and writers. Id. The "comment" must appear as an opinion. Id. When there is a question of whether
the words are comment or fact, the judge will send the issue to the jury if the words are reasonably capable of
being a comment. Id. at 118. The requisite proof is: (a) the subject matter is of legitimate public interest; (b)
the statement is based on true facts rather than a belief; and (c) the comment is fair because it is relevant to the
facts and it is the honest opinion of the writer. Id. at 118. Areas of legitimate public interest include: matters
of government and public administration; the public conduct of politicians or those seeking to hold public
office; and entertainers' performances, provided the comment does not involve personal attacks. Id. at 119.
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made during and on parliamentary, court and state proceedings.82 Qualified
privilege exists when public interest demands protection for statements made on
a particular occasion. Unlike absolute privilege, proof that the defendant made
the statements with malice defeats the defense of qualified privilege.' 4 The
defense of unintentional defamation exists to protect persons from consequences
of publishing statements that were innocent when published, but which sub-
sequently become defamatory for reasons unknown to the author at the time of
publication.' Apology with payment into the court, mainly a defense to benefit
newspapers, provides a defense if the newspaper can show that it offered or
published an apology and made a payment to the court.
86
6. Remedies
The remedies available for a defamed plaintiff include damages and
injunctive relief.87 Damages compensate the plaintiff for hann.8s The court will
issue injunctive relief to restrain publications of libel when it feels absent an
injunction, the defendant will continue to publish the material. 9
82. Id. at 130. For application of the defense of qualified privilege, see generally id. at 137-156
(describing the occasions where qualified privilege exists).
83. Adam v. Ward, [1917] A.C. 309, 348 (H.L.). Occasions for availability of qualified privilege
include statements: (1) which occur while performing a legal, moral or social duty; (2) made in furtherance or
protection of a public or private interest; (3) made in protecting a common interest; (4) made in certain reports,
such as those on parliamentary and judicial proceedings and those privileged under the Defamation Act of
1952. CARTER-RUCK, supra note 56, at 137-38. For a more in-depth discussion of the qualified privilege, see
id. at 137-56.
84. CARTER-RUcK, supra note 56, at 137.
85. See generally Defamation Act, 1952, § 4 (setting forth the defense of Unintentional Defamation).
The defendant's burden of proof consists of showing that he and any agent concerned with the contents of the
publication exercised all reasonable care with regard to the publication. CARTER-RucK, supra note 56, at 66.
There are two categories where this defense comes into play: (1) the statements were not intended to refer to
the plaintiff, and (2) the statements intended to refer to a real person, which for reasons unknown to the
defendant, are defamatory to this person or to some other person. Id at 164. See id at 164-70 (providing details
and procedures for this defense).
86. See CARTER-RuCK, supra note 56, at 169 (explaining the defense of apology with payment into
court).
87. Id. at 171. The court will issue injunctive relief to restrain publications of libel when it feels that
absent an injunction, the defendant will continue to publish the material. Id. at 180.
88. See Id. at 171 (providing the court has discretion in determining the amount of harm in light of the
surrounding circumstances). Punitive damages are available since a lump sum is awarded from which it is
difficult to determine the amount awarded as compensation as opposed to punishment. Id. at 172.
89. Id. at 180.
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7. Analogies to the Internet
As stated earlier, the tools available via the Internet with which an individual
can publish are e-mail, a news or discussion group, and a WWVW page.90
Again, according to English law, publication is achieved by communicating
a statement to a third party.9 ' Thus, if the sender of e-mail communicates a
defamatory statement to the third party addressee, that communicated statement
constitutes a publication for purposes of England's defamation law. 9 In addition,
due to the global nature of the Internet, publication may occur in various countries
simultaneously.93
a. Example 1
An interesting issue is ,whether publication occurs when the sender's
defamatory statement is e-mailed only to the subject of the statement. In this
situation, the sender does not intend to send the e-mail to third parties, but this
may be the result. Sending an e-mail message is analogous to sending a postcard
via the regular postal mail.94 Remember, in England, the law will presume a
publication in the case of a postcard since, by its nature, it is open for reading and
understanding by anyone who views it in the normal course of the mail route. 95
To understand why an e-mail message is analogous to a postcard, it is necessary
to comprehend what happens to the e-mail message between the time it is sent
from the sender and the time it arrives at the addressee.
By design, the Internet has ways of routing pieces of information, like e-mail,
via many different paths. Currently, most e-mail messages are not encrypted, and
they pass through a vast array of private and public networks to reach their final
90. See supra notes 32-50 and accompanying text (describing the modes of communication for Internet
users).
91. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (providing what constitutes publication for English libel
law purposes).
92. Since publication is defined as communication to a third party, e-mail messages communicated to
third parties will constitute publication for purposes of defamation law.
93. See supra notes 32-36 (discussing the global nature of the Internet).
94. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (referring to a postcard ps open to all those who handle
it during the course of the mail). E-mail messages are likewise open and can be observed by third parties in
transit. On Screen Warning Appearing via Submission of Unencrypted Information Using Netscape 3.0
[hereinafter On Screen Warning] (screen shot available on file with The Transnational Lawyer). Other
browsers provide similar warnings. Kaplinsky, supra note 27. See supra note 33 and accompanying text
(discussing the function of a browser); see also Password Sniffing, (visited Oct. 23, 1996 and on file with The
Transnational Lawyer) <http://www.ceas.rochester.edu:8080/Security/node8.html
#SECrION000312000000000000 (providing that all messages sent by computer can be read by any other
computer along the network). Computers can be programmed to view every message on the network, even
those not intended for a particular user. Id.
95. See supra note 74-75 (discussing the presumption of publication, under English libel law, for
postcards and telegrams).
504
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destinations. 96 In fact, a message from a particular sender to the same addressee
might travel a different path every time.97 At any point along the route where the
path has the option of changing (analogous to turns in a road), a person or entity
can read the information flowing through the network with a device known as a
",sniffer."98
Since postcards are considered open enough for a presumption of publication,
so should e-mail since there is an even greater opportunity for more people to
read e-mail messages through the Internet than postcard messages traveling
through the regular mail route. As with a postcard, one could rebut the pre-
sumption of publication by proving only one person, the addressee, received the
message. However, it is virtually impossible to determine if a particular item of
information has been captured along its ever changing route along the Internet.99
In order to rebut a presumption of publication, users should encrypt their
messages.1°° Utilizing encryption, no one but the original sender and intended
receiver with their digital signatures01 can read the messages, which renders
"sniffers" useless.'02 Someone using a "sniffer" would merely receive encrypted
information that is virtually impossible to interpret.
b. Example 2
Again, in determining the meaning of words in an allegedly libelous state-
ment, the standard is whether the reasonable person would find it defamatory.' 03
English law permits the reasonable person to consider circumstances surrounding
96. Interview with Alexander Kaplinsky, Vice President of USWeb NetWORKERS Web Consulting,
Inc. (Oct. 10, 1996).
97. Id.; see ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (providing communications sent
over the Internet can travel several routes to it destination).
98. On Screen Warning, supra note 94 (warning that any information submitted via the Internet can be
observed by a third party in transit, so if communicators wish to keep their message private, it would be safer
to cancel the transmission); see also Password Sniffing, supra note 94 (providing that all messages sent by
computer can be read by any other computer along the network). Computers can be programmed to view every
message on the network, even those not intended for a particular user. Id. Hackers have programs to scan all
the messages traversing a network. Id.
99. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text (stating that since it is almost impossible to prove
no one read a postcard along the mail route, it is virtually impossible to rebut the presumption of the
publication); cf. Kaplinsky, supra note 96 (noting that there is no way to determine if a message has been
scanned along its route since the specific route traveled is indeterminable).
100. Kaplinsky, supra note 96.
101. Though not all encryption is digital, most are. Id. The examples in this comment relate to digital
encryption.
102. Id. If a message is encrypted, rather than an on screen warning regarding insecurity of
transmissions, there will be a message stating the sender's transmission is secure. On Screen Warning, supra
note 94.
103. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text (setting forth the standard for determining the
defamatory nature of a communication).
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the publication.' 4 The ability to be creative in designing Web pages, and the titles
that one can give to e-mail messages or statements on a newsgroup, opens the
door to a vast array of surrounding circumstances to be considered by the rea-
sonable person.'05 Such circumstances may include the title of the page, the font
utilized with certain words along with the prominence given to particular items
of text; various graphic techniques; and the words submitted to the search
engines.'06
The following example focuses on Web pages, which can be easily published
by anyone desiring presence on the WWW.'0 7 Once a page is published, the
creator may submit certain words to a "search engine" to ensure viewing by the
Internet community. 0 8 Whenever an Internet user enters those specific words, the
creator's page will be referenced.' 9
Because of the ease of publication on the WWW, it is comprehensible how
the publisher can be subject rto libel law given that English law permits the
reasonable person to consider the circumstances surrounding the publication." 0
For example, assume John Doe publishes a WWW page, on which the statement
"Management Consultant Roger Art REALLY Knows What He's Talking
About." On its face, this message seems to be quite innocent. However, assume
that the word "REALLY" is blinking. In addition, assume that the phrase sub-
mitted to the search engine operator is "Security Fraud." Thus, every time a user
seeks to retrieve information on security fraud, the message "Management
Consultant Roger Art REALLY Knows What He's Talking About," with
"REALLY" blinking, is retrieved. Now the statement has a completely different
meaning. Not only can it be viewed as sarcasm due to the font and emphasis on
104. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text (discussing English & Scottish Co-op Properties
Mortgage & Investment Society Ltd. v. Odhams Press Ltd:, [1940] 1 All E.R. 1, at 4-7).
105. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text (providing the reasonable person may consider
circumstances surrounding the publication and draw inferences from them).
106. See Kaplinsky, supra note 96 (describing various techniques in designing WWW pages, and
transcribing e-mail and discussion group messages). See infra note 108 (noting the purpose of search engines).
107. Many people have a desire to talk to the world or prove their presence among the Internet
community; the WWW is the medium of choice. It is extremely easy for people to publish their own Web
pages. Kaplinsky, supra note 96. Many on-line service providers give their subscribers a place to house
personal Web pages. Id. Anyone who can use a word processor can make a Web page and, with the help of
an on-line account with a service provider, can put a personal Web page onto the Internet for the world to view.
Id.
108. Search engines, such as "Yahoo," "Excite," and "Altavista," exist to aid Internet travelers find what
they are looking for. Kaplinsky, supra note 96. For example, a user wishing to find out about the over the
counter drug melatonin used for insomnia, can type in "melatonin" or "sleep" at the search engine prompt, and
all references to pages discussing the drug will be retrieved. Id. In addition, if the WWW page creator wants
his page to come up every time a user enters "flowers" to a search engine prompt, he only needs to submit the
word to the search engine operator. Id. To find the above search engines, see <http://www.Yahoo.com>,
<http://www.Excite.com> and <http://www.Altavista.com> (visited Oct. 10, 1996).
109. See supra note 108 (illustrating how search engines work).
110. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text (setting forth that English libel law permits the
reasonable person to consider the circumstances surrounding the publication and draw inferences from them).
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"REALLY," but the Web page author is essentially saying that Roger Art is
involved with securities fraud.
An examination of the components of an e-mail message or communication
to a newsgroup likewise illustrates the potential for liability in light of sur-
rounding circumstances. When a sender transmits an e-mail message, there is a
box on the screen entitled "subject title." In this location, a sender has the option
of entitling the e-mail. In addition, there is an area designated "subject matter"
wherein the communicator may jot a short statement regarding the subject matter
of the message. Imagine an e-mail message which contains "broker is a fraud" as
the subject title, while the subject matter is illustrated by "John James is an
excellent broker." The actual text of the message talks about John James as a
wonderful broker, and thus the message seems innocent and nondefamatory.
However, the title attached to the message implies that the message is sarcastic
and, in effect, implies that John James is a fraud, and thus can be found
defamatory.
This same example illustrates potential liability for communications in
newsgroups. Newsgroups are organized by subject matter."' For example, there
may be a news server entitled "news.brokers."1 2 A person who enters this group
would see several users' views and opinions on brokers generally. Individuals
desiring to express themselves in the news.brokers newsgroup would write a short
statement in the subject column describing the essence of their message; this is
to enable other participants in the newsgroup to decide if they wish to view the
particular message. For example, a sender may write "broker is a fraud" in the
subject column. The text of the communication, however, may be patently
innocent, stating that "John James is the best broker in the world." Because this
statement is prefaced by the description "broker is a fraud," the implication is that
John James is a fraud. These examples illustrate how the circumstances sur-
rounding communications via the Internet can subject communicators to potential
liability.
11I. See supra notes 41-50 (discussing discussion groups and Usenet).
112. One utilizing the Netscape browser can go to a page entitled "Netscape News." On this page are
two windows: one is entitled "News Server," and the other "Sender" accompanied by a column designated
"Subject." The "News Server" window contains several titles illustrating the subject matter of particular
newsgroups. Once a particular group is chosen, the user will see the views and opinions of other users on the
relevant subject matter. Often there will be responses or elaborations on an individual's message by those who
wish to comment.
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 9
B. The United States
1. The U.S. Constitution
The First Amendment of the Constitution protects speech." Since defa-
mation actions deter a type of speech, that is, speech which is false and injurious
to a person's reputation, defamation law must comport with the Constitutional
requirements contained in the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment.
1 4
Historically, U.S. law protected one's reputation regardless of fault in making
the defamatory communication. 15 Now, U.S. law balances the competing values
of the public interest in preserving free speech against an individual's interest in
protecting his or her reputation." 6
In the United States, to maintain a cause of action for defamation, a plaintiff
must establish that the defendAnt acted in a particular way in publishing the
defamatory communication. The requisite degree of proof depends on whether
the defamatory statement is classified as one concerning a public official or
figure, or a private individual."
7
Statements about public officials" 8 or figures" 9 normally concern matters of
public interest.'2 Public officials and figures are primarily people with influence
who have access to a public medium through which to answer belittling false-
hoods.' 2' Public officials and public figures wishing to maintain a libel cause of
action must establish that the defendant acted with actual malice. 2 2 Actual malice
exists when the defendant acts with knowledge of the falsity of the statement or
with reckless disregard as to the truth of the statement.'2 Reckless disregard is
synonymous to acting with serious doubt as to the truth of a statement. 2 4 The
113. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
114. J.CLARK KELSO, UNFAIRTRADEPRACIcis LITGATION § 8.20 at 42 (Michie Co. 1995) [hereinafter
KELSO].
115. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 22, § 113, at 804.
116. Id.
117. See infra notes 117-28 and accompanying text (providing the burden of proof for a public official
or figure as compared to a private individual).
118. Public officials are government employees who, because of their position, "the public has an
independent interest in the qualifications and performances of the person who holds it, beyond the general
public interest in the qualifications and performance of all governmental employees." KELSO, supra note 114,
§ 8.20, at 45 n.183 (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966)).
119. KEL.SO, supra note 114, at § 8.20, at46 n.188 (providing public figures are persons who, because
of their position or because they voluntarily inject themselves into the center of public life, are valid subjects
of public interest).
120. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 22, § 113, at 805.
121. Id.
122. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,279-80 (1964).
123. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 22, § 113, at 806.
124. See KELSO, supra note 114, at § 8.20, 53.
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reason a defendant will be liable is that the First Amendment has no interest in
protecting speech consisting of communications made with actual malice."
Private individuals, unlike public officials and figures, have less opportunity
to answer defamatory statements since they have limited access to public
mediums of communication.'2 Additionally, private individuals, unlike public
officials and figures, do not voluntarily inject themselves into public life. 27 To
maintain a balance between First Amendment rights and a state's interest in pro-
viding compensation to private persons for injuries to their reputation, states
retain the power to determine the degree of fault a private plaintiff must establish,
so long as it is, at a minimum, negligence.' 8
2. The Cause of Action
Libel is a branch of defamation law that-involves the publication of a
defamatory statement in the form of written or printed words, its embodiment in
physical form, or any other form with the harmful qualities attributable to written
or printed words. 29
To sustain a cause of action for libel, a private person 30 must prove: (1) a
statement that is false and defamatory;' 3 1 (2) a nonprivileged 3 2 publication about
125. Id.
126. Id. at 49.
127. Id.
128. See infra notes 159-160 and accompanying text (discussing requisite degree of fault for a defendant
who publishes a defamatory statement about a private individual).
129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 568 (1977). Slander, the other branch of defamation law, is
the publication of defamatory matter by spoken words or transitory gestures. Id. Defamation on the Internet
will most likely be libel. CAVAZOS & MORiN, supra note 2, at 78. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 915 (6th ed.
1990) (defining libel as defamation expressed by print, writing, pictures or signs). A communication over the
Internet is often in written or pictorial form and remains posted until someone removes the statement.
Kaplinsky, supra note 27. Video and music are also available. Id This comment focuses on the common modes
of communication over the Internet by individuals: e-mail, discussion groups and the WWW. The first two
likely involve written communications, with the latter involving written and graphic communications. Id.
130. RESTAT4ENT(SECOND) OFTORTS § 580B (1977). This comment focuses on private persons. For
a more in-depth look at libel law as it applies to public individuals, see PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 22,
at 771-848.
131. REs'rATaiENY(SECOirD) OFTORTS § 558 (1977). At common law, the statement was presumed false
unless proved true by the defendant. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 22, at 839.
132. See infra notes 168-80 and accompanying text (discussing the defense of privilege).
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the plaintiff' to a third party;t34 and (3) fault at least to a degree of negligence! 35
on the part of the publisher.36
a. The Statement Must Be Defamatory
A communication137 is defamatory if it harms'38 the reputation of an in-
dividual so as to lower that person in the eyes of the community 139 or deter others
from associating with the person.'4 It is sufficient that the statement would tend
to prejudice the individual in the eyes of a substantial minority in the community;
it only must be shown that one or more persons actually received the com-
munication.'4' In contrast, English law requires the plaintiff's reputation be
affected in the eyes of more than a section of the community. 142
133. See infra notes 146-54 and accompanying text (setting forth what constitutes a publication).
134. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 580B
cmt. b (1) (1977) (illustrating that a communication mailed to a defamed person that comes to the attention of
a third party is considered a publication for purposes of defamation law). From this it follows that e-mail
coming to the attention of a third party qualifies as a publication.
135. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, at 1032 (defining negligence as failure to do something which a
reasonable person guided by ordinary considerations would do). Applied to defamation, negligence would
characterize the communication of a statement without first ascertaining the truth of the matter asserted.
136. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OFTORTS § 558 (1977). See generally Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323 (1974) (regarding how the First Amendment of the Constitution requires fault for liability).
Regarding private figures, states can choose the standard of fault they wish to apply, as long as it is not strict
liability. Id. at 347.
137. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oFToRTS § 559 cmt. a (1977) (defining communication to denote the
fact that one person has brought an idea to the attention of another).
138. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 cmt. d (1977) (stating it is not necessary the
communication cause actual harm to one's reputation or deter others from associating with her, as long as the
character of the communication has a general tendency to cause such an effect).
139. A community is "a group with common interests or rights." OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 171
(Heald Colleges ed. 1980). There is no requirement that the community be geographic in nature. See Id.
140. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 22, at § 111, at 774; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559
(1977).
141. RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS § 559 cmt. e (1977); see, e.g., Peck v. Tribune, 214 U.S. 185,
190 (1909) (holding words harming a person's reputation in the minds of a considerable and respectable sect
of the community, though not the entire community, are libelous). Among Internet users such as e-mailers,
communities are formed according to like interests, not locale; thus, a community can consist of members from
all over the world. See Shillito & Collin, supra note 51, at 20 (stating that th6 name of the bulletin board in the
Rindos case was "DIALx Science anthropology"); Weiner, supra note 12, at 23, (stating that 23,000 around
the world have accass to the board on which the message involved in the Rindos case was posted, most being
professional anthropologists and anthropology students); see generally Rindos v. Hardwick, W. Austl. Sup.
Ct. (unreported judgement 940164) (visited OcL 1995 and on file with The Transnational Lawyer) <
http://Mark.law.auckland.ac.nzlcases/Rindos.html> (stating that the libel statements involved were posted on
bulletin boards, located on an international newsgroup, designated to the subject of anthropology). One can
infer that those who access this board are part of a community with the like interest of anthropology.
142. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (providing the plaintiff's reputation must be reduced
among all, rather than a minority, of the community).
1996/Jurisdiction Over Communication Torts
b. Falsity of the Statement
At common law, the statement was presumed false unless the defendant
proved it was true. 43 The current law is that the plaintiff has the burden of
pleading and proving that the allegedly defamatory statement is false.1" This is
distinguishable from English libel law which presumes the falsity of the
statement. t45
c. Intentional Publication
Publishing a defamatory statement is accomplished by communicating the
message to another person. 46 The publisher must do this intentionally or negli-
gently.' 47 Furthermore, if persons intentionally or unreasonably fail to remove a
statement from an area under their control, they are liable for a publication.4 8 The
statement must be one of fact rather than opinion."49 Unlike England, it is
insufficient to presume a publication when a defamatory statement is written on
a postcard sent through the mail; rather, there must be proof that a third party
actually read it. 50
According to the single publication rule,'5' a single communication read by
more than two persons at once, or a single edition of a newspaper or broadcast is
considered one publication, no matter how many people read it. 52 Thus an
individual would only have one cause of action against a defamer. 53 This enables
143. PROSSER & KEErO N, supra note 22, at § 11, at 839.
144. See generally Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 769 (1986) (holding that the
plaintiff has the burden of proving falsity of the allegedly defamatory statement).
145. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text (setting forth the plaintiff's burden of proof as
excluding proof that the statement complained of is false).
146. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 577(1) (1977).
147. RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS § 577(1) (1977). Intent is established when the publisher does
something with the intent that it will be communicated to a third party or if the publisher is substantially certain
that it will be. Id at cmt. k. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 22, § 113, at 803 (explaining that there is no
liability if the defendant did not intend and could not reasonably anticipate that a third party would receive the
communication).
148. RESTATEmENT(SECoND)OFTORTS § 577(2) (1977). See generally Hellar v. Bianco, Ill Cal. App.
2d 424 (1952) (illustrating that a tavern owner who failed to remove a defamatory statement, of which he was
aware, written on the bathroom wall was liable for the continued publication).
149. See PROSSER & KEETN, supra note 22, § 113A, at 813 (stating that U.S. defamation law has always
distinguished between a publication of defamatory statement of fact versus opinion).
150. See id. at § 113, at 798; supra note 74 and accompanying text (providing English law regarding
postcards and telegrams).
151. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 577A (1977).
152. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 577A cmt. c (1977).
153. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 577A (4)(a) (1977).
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a plaintiff to collect all the damages from a single publication in one suit. ' On
the other hand, every republication of that communication would entitle the
defamed to an additional suit against the republisher. 55 England does not
recognize the single publication rule, and instead recognizes a new cause of action
for every publication.5 6
d. Identification
The plaintiff must show the recipient of the communication believes it refers
to the plaintiff.15 7 If the publication does not patently refer to the plaintiff, she
must plead and prove the defamatory meaning of the statement referred to her by
way of "colloquium."' 58
e. Fault
The First Amendment of the Constitution prohibits imposing liability without
fault on a defendant who publishes a defamatory statement about a private
person.1 9 Each state has the authority to choose the standard of liability to impose
on a defendant who publishes a defamatory statement about a private indivi-
dual.16 The lowest degree of fault upon which liability is found is negligence.' 6
154. See generally Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 104 S.Ct. 1473 (1984) (involving a suit for nationwide
damages under the single publication rule). Extent of circulation provides evidence as to damages. Palmer v.
Mahin, 120 F. 737, 747 (8th Cir. 1903).
155. RESTATEmENT(SECOND) OFTORTS § 577A cmt. a, illus. 1 (1977); see Nance v. Flaugh, 253 S.W.
2d 207, 207 (Ark. 1952) (illustrating that a person who repeats another person's defamatory quote in a letter
is equally defaming the plaintiff). It makes no difference whether a person made up the statement himself or
just repeated what he heard. Id.
156. See CARTER-RUCK, supra note 56, at 83 (noting English defamation law does not recognize the
single publication rule of the United States, which restricts a cause of action to the original publication).
157. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 22, at § 111, at 783.
158. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 22, at § 111, at 783. See, e.g., Cosgrove Studio & Camera Shop,
Inc. v. Pane, 182 A.2d 751,753 (Pa. 1962) (stating that where words are defamatory on their face, it doesn't
matter that the plaintiffis not specifically named as long as description or circumstances tend to identify him).
It is only necessary that some recipient reasonably believes the statement to refer to the plaintiff. Fitzpatrick
v. Age-Herald Publishing Co., 63 So. 980, 982 (Ala. 1913). If reference to the plaintiff would only be
understood due to extrinsic circumstances, the plaintiff must show that these circumstances were known to
some recipients of the communication who read the defamatory matter and reasonably believed it referred to
the plaintiff. Gnapinsky v. Goldyn, 128 A.2d 697, 703 (NJ. 1957).
159. See generally Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
160. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 347; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B,
Reporters Notes (1977) (illustrating that most states have imposed a negligence standard of fault).
161. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B (1977) (setting forth the situations in which a
defendant will be found liable for a defamatory statement). Defendants will be liable only when they: (1) know
the statement is false and that it defames the plaintiff; (2) act in reckless disregard of these matters; or (3) act
negligently in failing to ascertain these matters. Id. Negligence refers to a unreasonable risk of harm; thus in
dealing with defamation, the standard has been expressed as whether the defendant acted reasonably in
ascertaining the truth or falsity or defamatory nature of the communication before publishing it. Id. at cmt. g.
1996/Jurisdiction Over Communication Torts
The plaintiff bears the burden of proof. 62 In contrast, English libel law finds
intent to defame as irrelevant. 163
f Defenses
i. Truth
Proof that the allegedly defamatory statement is true is a complete defense to
liability.' 64 It is sufficient for the defendant to show the defamatory statement is
substantially true.' 65
ii. Consent
When the plaintiff consents to the defamatory statement by inviting the state-
ment, there is a policy of denying a request for recovery. The scope of the con-
sent is limited to the particular purpose or publication for which it is provided.167
iii. Privilege
Privilege permits conduct that would ordinarily be actionable to avoid
liability because the defendant's act furthers an important public interest which
deserves protection at the expense of harm to the plaintiff's reputation.16' There
are two types of privilege: (1) absolute privilege and (2) qualified privilege.'69
Absolute privilege provides immunity to speakers for their statements made
162. See RESTATa T (SEcoND) OFTORTs § 580B cmt.j (1977) (stating that there is no doubt that the
plaintiff bears the burden of proving fault).
163. CARTER-RUCK, supra note 56, at 50.
164. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580A (1977) (relating that a defendant is not subject to
liability for a defamatory statement that is true); see also Fleckenstein v. Friedman, 193 N.E. 537, 538 (N.Y.
1934) (providing no legal harm is done when the statement complained of communicates the truth); PROSSER
& KEETON, supra note 22, at § 116, at 842 (stating that the defendant doesn't have to prove the literal truth of
all the details of his statement, just the substantial truth).
165. See Bell Publishing Co. v. Garrett Engineering Co., 170 S.W.2d 197,203-04 (Tex. 1943) (implying
that defendants showing the statements complained of are substantially true, have a valid defense based on
truth).
166. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 22, § 114, at 823; see Burdett v. Hines, 87 So. 470, 470 (Miss.
1921) (holding that plaintiffs consenting to a past employer providing any information to a hew employer, get
what they asked for and cannot maintain a suit based on a damaging response). Smith v. St. Regis Corp., 850
F. Supp. 1296, 1322 (S.D. Miss. 1994) (affirming the holding in Burdett). Plaintiffs who consent by signature
to an inquiry into their past work performance and health, are barred from bringing a defamation action based
on the results of the inquiry. Id.
167. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 583, illus. 1 (1977) (illustrating that when a college
fraternity member consents to allowing a defamatory caricature of himself be printed on a menu for a fraternity
dinner, the scope of the consent is limited to that purpose).
168. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 22, at § 114, at 815.
169. Id. § 114-15, at 815-32.
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during and about judicial70 and legislative proceedings,17' makers of executive
communications, 72 political broadcasts 73 and defamatory communications made
according to the plaintiff's consent 74 Qualified privilege exists in situations
where the defendant is attempting to further an interest considered important
enough to allow some flexibility for error so that a defamatory publication should
be conditionally privileged. 7- The classes of protected interests include: pro-
tection of the defendant publishers' legitimate interests, 76 protection of interests
of individuals other than the publisher, 177protection of an interest common to the
publisher and others where the publication is likely to further it,'7 ' protection of
communications to an individual who may be expected to act in the public
interest, 79 and fair comment on matters of public interest."0
g. Remedies
Plaintiffs satisfying their burden of proof in a defamation action may recover
damages. For public officials or figures to recover compensatory damages, they
must establish the defendant acted with actual malice.' 8 1 When the plaintiff is a
private individual, but the defamatory communication involves a matter of public
concern, the plaintiff must prove fault at least to a degree of negligence to recover
compensatory damages." 2 In order for this individual to recover any punitive
damages, actual malice on the part of the defendant must be established. 13 On the
other hand, when the plaintiff is a private individual, and the content of the
170. Id. § 114, at 816-20 (5th ed. 1984). The policy behind this privilege is that a judge must able to
freely administer the law without fear of liability. Id. at 816.
171. 1d.§ 114, at 820-21.
172. Id. § 114, at 821-23. This privilege extends to governmental executive officers in the course of their
duties. Id. at 821.
173. Id. § 114, at 824. The privilege provides that broadcasts of political candidates shall not be
censored. Id.
174. Id. § 114, at 823. This privilege supports the policy that plaintiffs should not recover for conduct
they consent to. Id.
175. Id. § 115, at 825-32.
176. Id. § 115, at 825-26. For example, defendants may publish anything reasonably necessary to defend
their reputations against another's defamatory statement. Id. This must be done in an appropriate manner. Id.
177. Id. § 115, at 826 . The defendant must believe the publication is reasonably necessary to protect
another person and that such person is unable to protect himself. Id.
178. Id. § 115, at 828-30. A situation where the publisher and recipient of the communication have a
common interest is where the parties are members of an organization, such as corporate officers and
shareholders of that corporation. Id. at 828. In such cases, there is often an obligation to speak. Id.
179. Id. § 115, at 830-31. This privilege often involves communications to individuals expected to take
official action for protection of a public interest. Id. at 830.
180. Id. § 115, at 831-32. Fair comment refers to opinions about matters in which the public has a
legitimate public interest. Id. at 831.
181. KELso, supra note 114, § 8.20, at 52.
182. Id.
183. Id.
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communication is not a matter of public interest, the First Amendment permits
punitive damages upon proof of fault to a degree of negligence.
84
3. The Internet
In order to publish a defamatory statement over the Internet, a user need only
intentionally or negligently communicate a statement to a third party,185 or a Web
page host unreasonably fails to remove a defamatory statement, concerning a
third party, about 'vhich he has knowledge. 18 6 Thus, transmitting an e-mail
message or posting to a newsgroup are activities which can potentially subject
one to liability if the communications constitute defamation. 87 WWW pages
often provide space for viewer comments. 88 Should these be defamatory, then,
as with defamatory messages left on a bathroom wall, the person who controls the
WWW page may be liable. 89
If an individual reads a defamatory statement posted on a newsgroup or
receives one through e-mail, and then retransmits the statement to a third party
or posts it on another newsgroup, this person would be liable as a republisher.,19
C. Comparison Between England and the United States
English law is much stricter than U.S. law on the publisher of a defamatory
statement. In England, it is not necessary to prove the defendant's intent to
defame the plaintiff, whereas in the United States, the Constitution requires the
plaintiff to prove some degree of fault on the part of the publisher.' 9' In addition,
in England, the burden of proof regarding the truth of the statement falls on the
defamer, whereas in the United States, the defamed must prove the statement was
false. 192 These differences are important, since a publication over the Internet is
worldwide, which raises questions of which countries' laws will apply and the
potential to forum shop for the country with the most favorable law.' 93
184. Id.
185. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 129-36 and accompanying text.
188. Kaplinsky, supra note 96.
189. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
191. See generally Braithwaite, supra note 4, at 1216 (describing the harsh effects of English defamation
law); see also Litigation, supra note 7. at 10 (describing the harshness of English defamation law).
192. See generally supra note 58 and accompanying text; supra note 131 and accompanying text.
193. See Richards, supra note 20, at 613, (discussing choice of-law in the United States and England).
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IV. JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN DEFENDANTS
Before a court in either England or the United States can hear a case, it is
necessary to determine whether that court has authority over the parties. This
section focuses on this jurisdictional issue from the perspectives of English and
U.S. law.
A. England's Perspective
1. English Common Law
The English rules governing in personam actions194 are completely pro-
cedural.' 95 Any plaintiff can invoke, and any defendant can be subject to,
England's jurisdiction as long as the defendant is served with a writ of sum-
mons.' 96 Under English common law, only a person physicaly present in England
could be served with a writ of issuance. 97 The fact that service of a writ is the
only common law requirement for subjecting a defendant to the court's juris-
diction shows the courts have not been very concerned with a party's or a
dispute's connection to England!"
One consequence of relying on a purely procedural requirement is that the
court may exercise authority under the writ to hear cases that may not be appro-
priate for trial in England.19 To protect against an abuse of jurisdiction, a
defendant may apply to stay the proceedings because the English court is forum
nonconveniens.2
A result of the common-law requirement of service of a writ on a defendant
physically present in England, was that in situations where the defendant was not
present in England, the courts lacked the authority to try a case which would
otherwise be appropriate, such as in the case of a tort committed in England.2 '
This anomalous result was remedied by statute, the Common Law Procedure Act
194. See CHESHIRE AND NORTH, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 185 (1lth ed. 1987) (designating in
personam actions as those between parties).
195. Id.
196. Id.; I DicEY AND MORRIS. THE CONFLIcT OFLAWS 271 (12th ed. 1993) (explaining that if a writ
or originating summons cannot be legally served on a defendant, then the court has no authority to exercise
jurisdiction over the defendant). Issuance of a writ or originating summons is the process which forms the basis
for the English court's jurisdiction over a case. Id. at 270-71.
197. See idL at 316. A writ of issuance is a phrase used to denote the issuance of a writ or summons upon
the defendant. Id.
198. See CHESHIRE&NORTH, supra note 194, at 185.
199. Id.
200. Id. This doctrine allows the court to use its discretion to refuse to hear a case if it determines that
England is not the appropriate forum. Id. See infra notes 221-28 for a discussion of the doctrine and the relative
factors.
201. CHESHIRE & NORTH, supra note 194, at 186.
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of 1852, and later incorporated into Order 11 of the Rules of the Supreme
Court.202 The statute gives discretionary power to an English court to allow
service of a writ on an out of jurisdiction defendant, regardless of the defendant's
nationality.20 3 Therefore, an English court can obtain jurisdiction where: (1) the
defendant is served with a writ in England;2 (2) the defendant consents to juris-
diction by England's court;20 or (3) a statute or statutory order authorizes juris-
diction over a defendant abroad?06
2. Order 11 of the Supreme Court Rules
Order 11 deals with service of process beyond the scope of jurisdiction. 207
The introduction to Order 11 lists four categories for service out of jurisdiction.
Three relate to cases where leave from the court is not required, while the fourth
relates to cases where leave is required.0 Leave of the court is required for cases
falling under Order 11, rule l(1).20 The court may exercise its discretion to grant
leave under this rule where: (1) the defendant is not domiciled in a convention
country nor has consented to jurisdiction; or (2) the defendant is domiciled in a
202. DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 196, at 316; CHESHIRE & NORTH, supra note 194, at 186. The
Supreme Court Rules are effective in relation to all proceedings in the High Court and the Civil Division of
the Court of Appeals. THE SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 63, at 0.1, R.2. The High Court is composed
of three parts: (1) Queen's (King's) Bench Division, (2) Chancery Division, and (3) Family Division. THE
BLUEBOOK: AUNIFORM SYSTEM OFCITATION 277-78 (16th ed. 1996). The Rules set forth the conduct of civil
proceedings in the Supreme Court. THE SUPREME COURT PRAcTICE, supra note 63, at viii.
203. DIcEY & MORRIs, supra note 196, at 316; CHESHIRE AND NORTH, supra note 194, at 186.
204. CHESHIRE &NORTH, supra note 194, at 186.
205. Id.
206. DICEY & MoRIS, supra note 196, at 270.
207. THE SUPREME COURT PRACrIcE, supra note 63, at 83; DICEY & MORRiS, supra note 196, at 270.
208. THE SUPREME COURT PRACriCE, supra note 63, at 83. No leave from the court is required for the
following three categories: (1) where jurisdiction is given by the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgement Act 1982
and the defendant is domiciled in Scotland or Northern Ireland; (2) in cases similar to those in category one,
but where the defendant is domiciled in Scotland or Northern Ireland; and (3) where statutory authority to
exercise jurisdiction on out of state defendants is conferred on the court. Id. In 1968, the Brussels Convention
was signed by members of European Economic Community (E.E.C.) regarding civil jurisdiction and
enforcement of judgments. Id. The United Kingdom signed the convention in 1978 with some modifications.
Id. The Civil Jurisdiction and Judgement Act 1982 is made up of these conventions. Id. Order 11, R.l(2)(a)
lays out the rule in regard to cases among convention countries. Id. at 84-85. The United States is not a
convention country. See id. at 100 (listing the convention countries). The Act states that a defendant must be
sued in the courts of the state where he is domiciled if that state is a convention country, unless specified in
Articles 5 through 18 of the Act. Id. at 93. The word "domicile' for purposes of the act refers to the defendant's
true residence. Id. For a detailed coverage of the Act and Conventions, see 52 HALSBURY'S STATUTES 381.
209. Because this comment addresses the United States, and the United States is not a Convention
country for purposes of England's jurisdictional rules, this comment only discusses those situations where
leave of the court is required. For those situations where leave is not required, see supra note 208 (setting forth
the three categories for which leave from the Court is not required).
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convention country, but the claim at issue is not within the Civil Jurisdiction and
Judgment Act of 1982 and the Brussels Conventions.21
3. Order 11, Rule 1(1)
It is important to note that Order 11, rule 1 is judicially created under
statutory authority." As stated above, Order 11, rule 1(1) governs cases where
it is permissible for a judge to authorize service of writ out of the jurisdiction. t 2
Service of writ out of the jurisdiction is permissible with leave from the court pro-
vided that the cause of action at issue is among the permitted situations
enumerated in Order 11, rule 1(1).213 If service is permissible, then the court has
full discretion over whether to grant leave to serve the writ.214
The section governing a suit for defamation is Order 11, rule 1 (f).215 Order
11, rule 1(f) provides that if the claim is based on a tort, and damage was
sustained or resulted from an act committed within the jurisdiction, then service
of writ is permissible.216 The relevant act for purposes of a defamation cause of
action occurs where the defamatory statements are published and not where they
are posted or spoken.217
210. THE SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 63, at 83. See supra note 208 (discussing the Civil
Jurisdiction and Judgement Act of 1982 and the Brussels Convention).
211. DIcEY & MORRIS, supra note 196, at 316.
212. 1 THE SUPREME COURT PRAC.CE, supra note 63 at 83; DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 196, at 316;
CHESHIRE & NORTH, supra note 194, at 186.
213. THE SUPREME COURT PRACncE, supra note 63, at 83-84.
214. See id. at 83 (stating that service of writ out of the jurisdiction is permissible with leave of the
court); see also DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 196, at 317 (stating that jurisdiction is discretionary and that a
court can decline to allow service or issue of the writ).
215. THE SUPREME COURT PRACTIcE, supra note 63, at 84; DIcEY & MORRIS, supra note 196, at 340;
see id. at 341 (providing that defamation suits are governed by the section covering torts).
216. THE SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 63, at 84; DICEY & MORRIS supra note 196, at 340. The
provision for torts was previously under order 11, rule l(h) and only provided for cases where the act was
committed in the jurisdiction; this was amended in 1987 to the version stated above. Id.
217. DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 196, at 341; Diamond v. Bank of London and Montreal Ltd, [1979]
Q.B. 333, 1 All E.R. 561 (comparing the tort of negligent misrepresentation in which the tort occurs when the
misrepresentation made by telephone or telex is received and acted on, to the tort of defamation where the tort
occurs when the statement is published). In both negligent misrepresentation and defamation, damage is needed
for the claim to be actionable, but not for the tort to be committed. Id. See Bata v. Bata, [1948] W.N. 366, 366
(stating that the tort of defamation occurs where the libel statement is published). Bata was decided pre 1987,
and thus prior to the amendment resulting in the current order 11, rule 1(f). The rule prior to the amendment
only provided for cases where the act was committed in the jurisdiction. See supra note 216 (discussing rule
1(h)). Applying that rule, the court found that the act of publishing the statement occurred in England. Bata
v. Bata, [1948] W.N. 366, 366. The actual case involved a Canadian defendant who wrote defamatory letters
in Zurich regarding the English plaintiff. Id. Three copies of the letter were circulated to members of the British
company of which the plaintiff was the chairman. Id. In determining where the tort was committed the court
stated that the material part ofa cause of action for libel is the publication of the statement, not the writing. Id.
As applied to the case, the tort was the publication to third parties who lived in England, and thus the court held
that jurisdiction was proper. Id.
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The most important guiding principle for the court to follow in granting leave
is that the court should be extremely careful when deciding whether to permit
service of writ on foreign defendants. 218 The court must be cautious when
exercising its discretion, especially in cases where it may be burdensome on the
foreign defendant, in order to avoid offending foreign relations.219 In addition,
when the dispute has a tenuous connection to England, the plaintiff must show a
stronger case.220
In deciding whether England is the proper place for the suit, the court follows
the doctrine of forum conveniens.22' The court will make this decision when a
plaintiff requests the court to grant leave.m The considerations embodied in this
doctrine can be found in the case of Spilada Maritime Corp v. Cansulex Ltd
(Spilada)223 These same considerations are relied on when the defendant asks the
court to exercise its discretion to stay the proceedings on the ground that another
218. Societe Generale de Paris v. Dreyfus Bros. [1885] 29 Ch. D. 239, 242-43; DICEY & MORRIS,
supra note 196, at 316. There are three remaining guidelines for the court, none of which are pertinent to this
comment. Id. (1) The case must be within Order 11, rule I or rule 2. Under this guideline are four principles:
(a) The applicant can choose the category under rule 1(1) on which to rely. THE SUPREME COURT PRACTICE,
supra note 63, at 86; (b) If there is doubt in the construction of any of the Order 11 categories, the ambiguity
should be decided in favor of the defendant. Societe Generale de Paris v. Dreyfus Bros., 29 Ch. D.at 242-43;
The Hagen [1908] P. 189, 201 (stating ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the foreigner); (c) Since the
court uses the plaintiff's application for service out ofjurisdiction'for determining whether the case falls within
Order 11, all relevant facts should be fairly and fully disclosed. Societe Generale de Paris v. Dreyfus Bros.,
29 Ch. D. at 242-43; THE SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 63, at 86; DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 196,
at 316; and (d) The court will not grant leave if it is within the letter but outside the spirit of the rule. Johnson
v. Taylor Bros., [1920] A.C. 144, 153; Beck v. Value Capital Ltd., [1975] 1 W.L.R. 6; THE SUPREME COURT
PRACTICE, supra note 63, at 86. (2) The applicant's burden of proof requires showing that there is a "good
arguable case on the merits," meaning that there must be something more than just a prima facie case. THE
SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 63, at 86; DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 196, at 319; Metall und
Rohstoff AG v. Donaldson Lufkin and Jenrette Inc. and Another, [1990] Q.B. 391. Where questions of fact
are involved, the court will look mainly to the plaintiff's case; however the defendant can always REBUT. THE
SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 63, at 87. In cases involving questions of law, the court can look at the
issues and refuse to grant leave if it determines that the plaintiff is most likely to fail. (4) The Court must be
satisfied from the plaintiffs application that it should exercise discretion to grant leave. Id.
219. Id. at 87.
220. Id.; The Hagen [1908] P at 191-292.
221. CHESHIRE&NORTH, supra note 194, at 185; DICEY&MORRIS, supra note 195, at318.
222. Spilada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd.,[1986] 3 All E.R. 843. For a request that the court grant
leave, the burden is on the plaintiff to show that England is clearly the appropriate forum. Id.; THE SUPREME
COURT PRACTICE, supra note 63, at 87. In discharging this burden, the plaintiff is not limited to showing that
justice could not be obtained in an alternative forum, and may rely on the nature of the dispute, the legal and
practical issues involved, local knowledge, witness availability and his evidence and expense. Spilada Maritime
Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd., [1986] 3 All E.R. 843; THE SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 63, at 87.
223. Spilada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd.,[1986] 3 All E.R. 843. This case involved a contract
dispute. Id. See infra notes 255-58 and accompanying text (applying the Spilada case to defamation suits); see
also DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 196, at 318 (relating that the Spilada case contains the considerations that
guide the court in aforum conveniens determination).
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forum is more appropriate.224 The main principle followed in these determinations
is that the court should choose the forum where the case can most suitably be
heard for the interests of all the parties and for justice. 5 The court also considers
which forum has the most substantial connection to the action in terms of con-
venience, expense, witness availability, the law governing the transaction at issue,
and the parties' places of residence or business.2 If the court does not find a
more appropriate forum, it will usually refuse the defendant's request to stay the
proceedings; however, if it determines that another forum is prima facie more
appropriate, it will grant the stay unless other circumstances dictate otherwise.227
Although the refusal to grant leave or the granting of a stay of proceedings might
deprive the plaintiff of legitimate personal or juridical advantages available in
England, this will not generally prevent the court from exercising its discretion
in the decided manner if it is convinced that substantial justice would be done to
all the parties in the available and appropriate forum.
4. Jurisdiction Cases Involving Torts: Order 11, Rule 1(W
Order 11, rule 1(f) outlines when the court may grant leave in a tort case.
Present law requires plaintiffs to show their action was founded in tort, and either
that the act causing damage was committed in the jurisdiction or that the damage
was suffered within the jurisdiction. 229 The Supreme Court guidelines state that
tort cases prior to 1987 are unlikely to be helpful precedents and set out some
guidelines for the court to follow. 30
224. Spilada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd., [1986] 3 All E.R. 843. The only difference between a
determination for granting leave and that for a stay of proceedings is the party who bears the burden of the
proof, and what that burden entails. Id. In a request for a stay of proceedings, a defendant must not only show
that England is not the appropriate forum, but in addition, that there is another forum which is clearly more
appropriate. Id.; TrE SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 63, at 87.
225. Spilada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd., [1986] 3 All E.R. 843; THE SUPREME COURT PRACTICE,
supra note 63, at 87.
226. Spilada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd., [1986] 3 All E.R. 843; THE SUPREME COURT PRACTICE,
supra note 63, at 87.
227. Spilada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd., [1986] 3 All E.R. 843; THE SUPREME COURT PRACTICE,
supra note 63, at 87. Circumstances which may dictate against granting a stay when a more appropriate forum
exists include the possibility that the plaintiff would not obtain justice in the other forum. Id.
228. Spilada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd., [1986] 3 All E.R. 843; THE SUPREME COURT PRACTICE,
supra note 63, at 88.
229. THIE SUPREME COURT PRACTicE, supra note 63, at I (1)(f), at 91; see DICEY & MORRIS, supra note
196, at 340 (mentioning that the provision for torts was previously under order 11, rule 1(h) and only provided
for cases where the act was committed in the jurisdiction). The section governing torts was amended in 1987
to the version in the accompanying text. Id. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (explaining that in a
cause of action for defamation, the act is publishing, and thus the tort occurs where the statement is published).
230. THE SUPREME COURT PRACIcE, supra note 63, (1)(f), at 91. In 1987, the provision for torts was
amended from the prior Order 11, rule (1) (h), to the present order 11, rule (1) (f). DICEY & MORRIS; supra note
196, at 340. Prior to the amendment, the court could only grant leave where the act was committed in the
jurisdiction. Id.
520
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In deciding whether a tort was committed in England or another country, the
court should look at the events and ask "where in substance the cause of action
arises."' ' t The court applies English law to this question 3 2 Once the court
decides that the cause of action was substantially committed in England, it is
irrelevant that some of the pertinent events took place elsewhere3' On the other
hand, if the court decides the tort was substantially committed in a foreign
country, then the court will only grant leave if two conditions are met: (1) the act
complained of would be a tort if committed in England, and (2) the tort is also
actionable in the foreign country where the act was committed.3
When determining whether damage was suffered in the jurisdiction, it is
enough that some significant damage was sustained in England.23
5
5. Defamation Cases Where the Plaintiff Seeks Jurisdiction in England
To see how the English courts will treat a claim based on defamation from
Internet communications, it is useful to examine the manner in which the courts
have handled traditional defamation suits involving foreign defendants.
In determining whether to exercise jurisdiction over an American company,
the court in Kroch v. Rossell et Cie (Kroch)236 focused on the number of copies
of a French and Belgian newspaper circulated in England. 37 The court denied
leave, emphasizing the plaintiff had no reputation in nor associations with
England other than as a temporary resident for purposes of the libel action, the
231. THE SUPREE COURT PRACTICE, supra note 63, at 91; see also Multinational Gas & Petrochemical
Co. v. Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Services Ltd., [1983] 2 Ch. 258, [1983] 2 All E.R. 563 (applying
this test in a negligence tort case prior to the 1987 amendment where a major issue of the case involved
determining where the tort was committed).
232. THE SUPREME COURT PRAcTicE, supra note 63, at 91; see supra note 68 (stating that in a defamation
case, English law states that the tort occurs where the statement is published).
233. THE SUPREME COURT PRAcrIcE, supra note 63, at 91. In determining whether the act in question
was committed in England, the court should look at the purported tort in a common sense manner and
determine whether substantial acts committed within the jurisdiction caused the damage, regardless of whether
or not such acts were committed elsewhere as well. Metall und Rohstoff v. Donaldson Lufkin and Jenrette Inc.
and Another (1989), [1990] Q.B. 391; THE SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 63, at 92.
234. Chaplin v. Boys, [1971] App. Cas. 357, [1969]2 All E.R. 1085; see also THE SUPREME COURT
PRACTICE, supra note 63, at% (1)(f), at 91-92 (emphasizing that if the court decides the tort was in substance
committed in a foreign country, then the court should apply the rule laid out in Chaplin to determine if it should
grant leave).
235. Id.
236. Kroch v. Rossell et Cie, [1937] 1 All E.R. 725.
237. Id. at 728-29; see also DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 196, at 342 (illustrating the Kroch case as an
example where the court denied exercising jurisdiction). In the Kroch case, the plaintiff sued a publisher for
a libelous statement contained in its French and Belgian newspaper of which few copies were sold in England.
Kroch, 1 All E.R. at 726-27.
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papers containing the libel were published in France and Belgium, and the
circulation was confined almost completely to those countries.'
The case of Bata v. Bata (Bata) illustrates the meaning of the phrase "an act
committed within the jurisdiction" under order 11, rule I (f)M9 In Bata v. Bata,
the court granted leave for an English plaintiff against a Canadian defendant 40
Although the defendant wrote the three letters containing the libel in Zurich, the
court held jurisdiction was proper since the tort, publishing the letters to third
parties, occurred in England where the letters were sent.24t
In Birks v. National Enquirer Inc. (Birks),242 a case decided under the
amended version of Order 11, rule 1 relating to torts, the court considered
whether, in a cause of action for defamation, the principles from Kroch v.
Rossel2 43 or those from Spilada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd.2 4 should
apply.245 In Birks v. National Enquirer Inc.,2 6 the plaintiff was a public relations
consultant who had lived and worked in California and New Zealand until near
the time of the suit; her only connection to England were frequent visits to her
daughter, an English resident, and some friends.247 A major English paper
circulated 15,000 copies of a story about the plaintiff being responsible for the
destruction of the marriage of a well known person in England?48 The plaintiff
sued the paper in July 1991 and received an apology as well as damages. 249 The
defendant (an American publishing company which circulated about 3.5 million
copies of its paper in the United States, including California, as compared to
238. Id. at 728-29. The court stressed that even a very small circulation of a foreign language publication
could harm a person's reputation among people of England. Id. at 729. The problem in the case was the
plaintiff had no reputation nor connections with England, nor did he have an occupation. Id. at 729.
239. See TiE SIJPREME COURTPRACTIcE, supra note 63, at 84 (stating, in Order 11, rule 1 (f), that leave
may be granted where "the claim is founded on a tort and the damage was sustained, or resulted from an act
committed within the jurisdiction"); see also infra note 241 (discussing the prior order 11, rule 1(h) as
applicable during the Bata case, and its requirement that for jurisdiction based on a tort claim, the act had to
be committed within the jurisdiction).
240. Bata v. Bata, [1948] W.N. 366, 366.
241. Id. This case occurred prior to the 1987 amendment to the Supreme Court rule resulting in the
current Order 11, rule 1(f). See supra note 229 (discussing the prior order 11, rule(h) and the limitation of
jurisdiction for torts to those where the act was committed in the jurisdiction). Bata illustrates that the 'act'
referred to in order 11, rule 1(h), and thus the current order 11 rule 1(f), is the publication of the allegedly
defamatory statement to a third party. Bata v. Bata, 1948 W.N. 366.
242. Birks v. National Enquirer Inc. (C.A. 1991) and available via LEXIS Fili Engcas.
243. Kroch v. Rossell et Cie, [1937] 1 All E.R. 725; see supra notes 236-38 (setting forth the principles
in the Kroch case).
244. Spilada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd., [1986] 3 All E.R. 843; see supra notes 223-28 (discussing
the Spilada case). Spilada involved a contract dispute. Id.
245. Birks v. National Enquirer Inc. (C.A. 1991) and available via LEXIS File Engcas.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. The paper alleged plaintiff was responsible for ruining the marriage of a well-known English
citizen and alleged she had an affair with him. Id.
249. Id.
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about 250 copies in England and Wales in 1988) paper carried this report which
led the plaintiff to sue it in England250 The plaintiff claimed that her reputation
was damaged there.2 1 The court's discretion in granting leave was challenged by
the defendant who contended that the Kroch case controlled in a defamation suit,
not Spilada which was based on a breach of contract.2 12 The defendant asserted
that the small number of circulated copies in England as compared to the United
States, along with the U.S. residency of the plaintiff, mandated that the court
should not have granted leave 3 To the defendant's dismay, the court held that
Kroch v. Rossell et Cie was based on the specific facts of the case, and that a
judge must make a case by case decision based on the individual facts.254 The
court further held that the question on whether to grant leave is one of fact as to
whether the plaintiff has established a cause of action and whether he or she can
satisfy the Spilada principles 55 The Spilada principles require a showing that
England is both the appropriate-and suitable forum in which the case can be tried
for the interests of all the parties and for the ends of justice. 2 6 In granting leave
in favor of the plaintiff, the court focused on the existence of a reputation for the
plaintiff in England.25 This case illustrates that the Spilada principles are
applicable to defamation suits. 2 8
To summarize, the English court will decide whether to hear a libel case
regarding foreign plaintiffs or defendants by looking at the facts of each case.2 9
The court will consider a defendant publications's relative circulation in England
as compared to elsewhere, 260 but ultimately will decide the issue by considering
the principles laid out in Spilada, including a focus on the plaintiff's reputation
in England,261 to determine if England is truly the forum conveniens.262 The
ultimate goal is fairness and justice for all the parties.2 63
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. See supra note 225 and accompanying text (discussing Spilada).
257. Birks v. National Enquirer Inc. (C.A. 1991) and available via LEXIS File Engcas.
258. See id. (stating that Spilada principles apply to defamation suits).
259. See supra notes 236-58.
260. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 257 and accompanying text (discussing Birks v. National Enquirer, and the court's
focus on the plaintiff's reputation).
262. See supra notes 256-58.
263. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
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6. Potential Results of Applying Jurisdiction Law to Internet De-
famation Suits
To illustrate the application of English jurisdiction law to the Internet, the
following is an example of a potentially defamatory statement regarding an
ornithologist. Assume there are two American professors of ornithology, Pro-
fessor Jay and Professor Robins. Professor Robins gives lectures on ornithology
in England about five weeks a year; he makes a substantial amount of money
from this. Professor Jay visits England as well, but infrequently. Professor Jay
publishes a Web page entitled "Professor's Real Expertise." The text of the page
states that "Professor Robins' only real interest is chasing Birds;" the word
"Birds" appears to be rippling. The log files show a vast minority of people in
England have accessed the page; about twice as many people have accessed the
page in the United States as well as a substantial amount from various other
locations in the world. Professor Robins wants to bring a defamation suit in
England against Professor Jay for making a libel statement over the Internet that
negatively affected his reputation in England. Will the English court grant leave
to issue a writ of summons to bring Professor Jay into England's court system?
The first hurdle is to determine if the Web page is defamatory to Professor
Robins. On its face, the statement that "Professor Robins' only real interest is
chasing Birds" appears quite innocent; after all, ornithology is the study of birds,
and the Professor is an ornithologist. However, the term "bird" is a slang term in
England referring to a young girl, analogous to the slang term "chick" in the
United States. Thus, the statement may be interpreted in England as Professor
Robins chases young girls. In determining whether the communication is
defamatory or not, the jury will be permitted to consider surrounding cir-
cumstances. 2 4 In England, the phrase coupled with the title "Professor Robins'
real expertise," could be viewed as derogatory to Robins' reputation.
Additionally, the graphics technique of displaying the word "Bird' in a rippling
manner emphasizes that particular word. Thus, in England, given the choice bet-
ween an innocent and a defamatory interpretation of the communication, it would
most likely be viewed as defamatory.261 In the United States on the other hand,
"bird" does not have the same connotation, thus even with the emphasis on the
word, most U.S. residents, unless from an English background, would not view
the word as disparaging.
264. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text (providing that in determining whether a statement
is defamatory, the reasonable person may consider the surrounding circumstances, such as font and prominence
given to the statement).
265. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing English & Scottish Co-op Properties
Mortgage & Investment Society Ltd. v. Odhams Press Ltd. (1939), [1940] 1 AIIE.R. at 4-7 (1939)).
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Having established that the communication will be considered defamatory in
England, the issue arises whether the English courts will grant leave to issue a
writ of summons to Professor Jay in the United States.
In Birks v. National Enquirer, the English court applied the Spilada principles
to determine if England was the forum conveniens.2 In Birks, less than one
percent of all the copies of the publication were circulated in England and Wales
combined as compared to the amount circulated in the United States.6 7 In the
hypothetical situation, it is difficult to determine the total number of copies
circulated since it may not be known with precision how many individuals access
the Web page.m We do know that a substantial minority accessed the page from
England, while about twice that amount accessed it from various states in the
United States. Furthermore, Professor Robins does have a reputation in England
among those who attend his lectures which he gives about five times a year269
Based on Birks, it appears that Professor Jay could find himself subject to
England's jurisdiction.
B. The U.S. Perspective
1. The Basic Requirements
In order for a U.S. court to gain jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant,
two standard requirements must be satisfied: (1) the forum state's long arm
statute which permits the state to reach out and pull the defendant in for a cause
of action and; (2) the constitutional requirement of due process.271 The first
requirement is satisfied if the forum state's long arm statute is satisfied?72 The
long arm statutes, which vary from state to state, set out the causes of action over
which a state court is permitted to exercise jurisdiction.2 73 Some state long arm
266. See supra notes 245-58 and accompanying text (explaining the case of Birks v. National Enquirer).
267. See supra notes 245-57 and accompanying text (explaining the case of Birks v. National Enquirer).
268. Kaplinsky, supra note 96 (providing in most WWW sites, the number of accessors will be
determinable, but there are a number of technical reasons why one cannot always determine the exact number
of accessors).
269. See supra notes 239, 257 and accompanying text (noting the emphasis the English courts place on
whether a plaintiff has a reputation in England). A person's reputation can still be harmed by a small
circulation in England. Kroch v. Rossell et Cie, [1937] 1 All E.R. at 729.
270. See infra notes 272-75 (discussing the long arm statute requirement).
271. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (explaining that "[t]he Due
Process clause protects an individual's liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum
with which he has established no meaningful 'contacts, ties, or relations."'
272. Lex Computer v. Eslinger, 676 F. Supp. 399,402 (1987); Landmark Bank v. Joseph Manchura, 736
F. Supp. 375,379 (1990); Davila v. Southeast Bank, 738 F. Supp. 45,47 (1990).
273. See Lex Computer v. Eslinger, 676 F. Supp. at 402 (setting forth the New Hampshire long arm
statute which states that "[any person who is not an inhabitant of this sate and who, in person or through an
agent, transacts any business within this state, commits a tortious act within this state, or has the ownership,
use, or possession of any real property situated in this state submits himself, or his personal representative, to
The Transnational Lawyer/ VoL 9
statutes are so limited as to exclude jurisdiction for a cause of action based solely
on defamation, 274 while others are as broad as to authorize a court to exercise
jurisdiction to the full extent of the Due Process clause of the Fifth and Four-
teenth amendments.275 The second requirement is met provided that the defendant
has sufficient contacts with the forum state, such that asserting jurisdiction com-
ports with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' 276 In addition
to minimum contacts with the forum state, asserting jurisdiction must be fair and
reasonable in light of various considerations.2 With regard to foreign defendants,
the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any cause of action arising from or growing out of the acts
enumerated above.") (emphasis added). In this case, the defendant sent defamatory letters to clients of the
plaintiff. The court held that the long arm statute was satisfied since the impact of the defendant's out of state
conduct (sending a letter from out of state) resulted in New Hampshire tort, and it was more than fortuitous
so that the defendant knew or should have known that his conduct could injure a person in the state. Id. at 402-
403. See Far West, Inc. v. Towne, 46 F.3d 1071, 1074 (1995) (stating the Utah long arm statute which requires
that the plaintiff establish defendant conducted certain enumerated activities in Utah, and a nexus between
plaintiff's claim and the defendant's conduct). The court specified that phone calls and letters are not
necessarily sufficient to establish minimum contacts of the nonresident defendant with the forum state. Id. at
1076. See Landmark Bank v. Joseph Machera, 736 F. Supp. at 383 (relating the Massachusetts long arm statute
which provides that "[a] court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an
agent, as to a cause of action in law or equity arising from the person's (a) transacting any business in this
commonwealth; ... (c) causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this commonwealth; [or] (d) causing
tortious injury in this commonwealth by an act or omission outside this commonwealth if he regularly does
or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from
goods used or consumed or services rendered, in this commonwealth.. ."). The Massachusetts Long Arm
Statute, part c, is satisfied "[w]here a defendant knowingly sends into a state a false statement, intending that
it should there be relied upon to the injury of a resident of that state... he has acted within that state." Id. at
384.
274. See e.g. Ga. Code Ann. 9-10-91 (1990) (providing that jurisdiction is not permitted for a cause of
action for defamation arising out of a tortious act or omission within the State); N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. 302(a)
(McKinney 1990) (illustrating that portions of the statute are specifically written to exclude a cause of action
for defamation); Minn. Stat. Ann. 543.19(l)(d)(3) (West 1988) (stating that jurisdiction is not permitted for
out of state activities causing injury within if the cause of action is in defamation).
275. See e.g. Caruth v. International Psychoanalytical Association, 59 F.3d. 126, 127 (9th Cir.1995)
(relating that the California long arm statute permits jurisdiction "on any basis not inconsistent with the
Constitution of this state or of the United States.").
276. International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 316; see World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,297 (1980) (proclaiming that in analyzing a defendant's minimum contacts a court
should consider whether the defendant's conduct and connection with the state are such that he should
"reasonably anticipate being haled into court there"); see also Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977)
(stating that due process requires that persons have "fair warning that a particular activity may subject [them]
to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign"); cf Hanson v. Deckla, 357 US. 235,253 (1958) (proclaiming that
it is necessary for the defendant to avail himself of the privilege acting within the forum state); Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984) (confirming that "fair warning" is satisfied if the defendant
"purposefully directed" his activities at residents of the forum state); Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior
Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (announcing that to comply with the requirements of due process, the
defendant must purposefully direct his actions towards the forum state).
277. See infra notes 292 and accompanying text (setting forth the factors considered in determining
whether exercise of jurisdiction comports with the notions of fair play and substantial justice).
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the reasonableness of extending personal jurisdiction across national borders
demands much attention as well.2 78
Personal jurisdiction can be broken down into two types, general and
specific.2 79 The requisite contacts needed to satisfy the due process prong of a
personal jurisdiction analysis depend on whether specific or general jurisdiction
is sought. 80 With general personal jurisdiction, one would look to see if the
defendant has purposeful and systematic contacts with the forum state in order to
justify jurisdiction.2' Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand, looks at the
relationship between the contacts leading to personal jurisdiction and the activities
underlying the cause of action. 2 Thus, with specific jurisdiction, the requisite
level of minimum contacts may only include one contact with the forum, pro-
vided the cause of action arises out of that contact.8 3 Specific jurisdiction is
usually the type of personal jurisdiction involved in defamation suits.
278. See infra notes 298-301 and accompanying text (setting forth the unique burdens involved when
dealing with a foreign defendant).
279. See Landmark Bank v. Joseph Marchero, 736 F. Supp. 375, 379 (1990) (distinguishing between
specific and general personal jurisdiction); see also International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 317
(explaining that the defendant's contacts within the forum are not as significant when the cause of action arises
from the defendant's contacts in the forum as when the cause of action is related to those contacts).
280. See Landmark Bank, 736 F. Supp. at 384 (asserting that the level of necessary contacts to satisfy
the fairness requirement of the due process prong is in part dependent on whether specific or general
jurisdiction is being sought).
281. See Landmark Bank, 736 F. Supp. at 379 (describing the necessary contacts in order for a court to
exercise jurisdiction based on general personal jurisdiction).
282. See Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (explaining that where a forum seeks
specific jurisdiction over a non-consenting, foreign defendant, the "fair warning" requirement announced in
Shaffer v. Heitner is met if the defendant "purposefully directed" his activities at residents of the forum state,
and the cause of action results from purported injuries arising out of or relating to those activities); The
Landmark Bank v. Joseph Marchero, 736 F. Supp. at 379 (noting the necessary contacts for jurisdiction based
on specific personal jurisdiction). The level of contacts to constitute "fair warning" depends on the cause of
action and whether general or specific jurisdiction is sought. Id.; Lex Computer v. Eslinger, 676 F. Supp. at
403 (relating that the requisite minimum contacts to satisfy the due process clause of the 5th and 14th
amendments are established when the defendant purposefully directs activities to residents of the forum state,
and litigation results from purported injuries arising out of or relating to those activities); Caruth v.
International Psychoanalytical Association, 59 F. 3d 126 (9th Cir. 1995) (maintaining that specific jurisdiction
is appropriate when a nonresident defendant purposefully directs activities toward the forum or a resident
thereof; the claim arises out of or relates to the defendants forum-related activities; and exercise ofjurisdiction
is reasonable to constitute fair play and substantial justice).
283. See id at 379 (stating that one contact may be sufficient for jurisdiction based on specific personal
jurisdiction). This is especially true with torts. Id International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 317 (providing
that less contacts are required within the forum if the cause of action is based upon those contacts); Landmark
Bank v. Joseph Marchero, 736 F. Supp. at 385 (emphasizing that Massachusetts courts have held a single act
within the forum constitutes sufficient contacts to justify assertion of jurisdiction). One of these cases held that
a single telex sent from a British defendant to a Massachusetts plaintiff was enough to support jurisdiction. Id.
at 385.
284. See Landmark Bank v. Joseph Machera, 736 F. Supp. at 379 (specifying that specific jurisdiction
is usually more appropriate for allegations of tortious conduct).
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In addition to the traditional personal jurisdiction cases, a line of cases has
developed dealing strictly with libel and defamation. 5 These cases read tradi-
tional cases broadly, sometimes yielding surprising results.8 6 If applied to the
Internet, the results could be shocking.87
2. The Cases that Established the Modem Personal Jurisdiction Law
The United States, taking its lead from early English case law, followed the
territorial principle~s in the famous jurisdictional case of Pennoyer v. Neff.28 9
During the first half of the twentieth century, the territorial requirement was
rejected and replaced with the requirement that a state must have sufficient
contacts with the defendant to an extent that maintenance of a suit locally would
not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'"29 The case of
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson (World-Wide) defined "substantial
justice." t9' World-Wide stated several factors to be considered, in addition to the
establishment of minimum contacts, in determining whether asserting personal
jurisdiction would constitute "fair play and substantial justice": (1) the burden on
the defendant; (2) the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the
plaintiffs interest in getting efficient relief; (4) efficient resolution of the contro-
versy and; (5) the social policy interests of possible jurisdictions. 292 World-Wide
also asserted that the unilateral activity of one claiming a relationship with a
nonresident defendant does not qualify as a sufficient contact with the forum state
for minimum contact purposes.293 The court further explained that due process
would not be violated if a corporate defendant entered products into the stream
285. See infra notes 304-19 and accompanying text (describing the Calder case and its progeny).
286. See infra note 317 and accompanying text (relating the application of the Calder case to various
other libel cases).
287. See infra notes 342-43 and accompanying text (examining the results from application of a broad
interpretation of the Calder case).
288. J. Starke, Introduction to International Law, in BARRY E. CARTER AND PHILIP R. TRIMBLE'S
INTERNAnTONAL LAW 728, 728 (2 ed. 1995) (mentioning that historically, England followed the territorial
principle of jurisdiction, which allows a country to exercise jurisdiction over property and persons that occur
within its territory).
289. 95 U.S. 714 (1877); Graham C. Lilly, Jurisdiction Over Domestic andAlien Defendants, 69 VA.
L. REV. 85, (1983).
290. International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
291. 444 U.S. at 286. World-Wide involved a products liability action whereby a New York corporation.
having no contacts with Oklahoma, was sued in that State due to an accident there resulting from a car sale to
New York residents in New York. Id. The court held that it was not enough that it was "foreseeable" that the
car would cause injury in Oklahoma due to its mobile nature; rather, it would be necessary for the defendant
to "purposefully avail" itself of the privilege of conducting activities in Oklahoma. Id. at 295-97.
292. Id. at 286, 292.
293. Id. at 297. The assertion regarding a unilateral activity was made because the court stated that the
car finding its way to Oklahoma was completely the unilateral activity of the purchaser. Id.
528
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of commerce with the anticipation they would be bought by consumers in the
forum state.294
The case of Burger King v. Rudzewicz (Burger King) reinforces the notion
that if a person or corporation purposefully directs its activities toward the forum
state, then they can reasonably anticipate being haled into that state's court.295 In
addition, it makes no difference that the defendant never physically entered the
forum state in order to satisfy the minimum contacts requirement;296 "it is an
inescapable fact of modem commercial life that a substantial amount of business
is transacted solely by mall and wire communications across state lines, thus
obviating the need for physical presence."
297
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California (Asahi), a case
involving a Japanese corporation as a defendant, focused on the reasonableness
of asserting personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant in U.S. courts.298 The
court examined the World-Wide factors and determined that even though the
goods were placed into the stream of commerce, asserting personal jurisdiction
over these foreign defendants would be unreasonable.2 9 In addressing the World-
Wide factors, the court stated the unique burdens involved when dealing with an
alien, such as the burden of traveling to another country to have a case submitted
to a foreign judicial system, should be given significant weight when determining
the reasonableness of asserting personal jurisdiction over national borders? e°
Moreover, substantive and procedural policies of other nations and the U.S.
Government's policy interests in foreign relations will best be respected by
serious consideration of the reasonableness of extending jurisdiction inter-
nationally.301 The ease of publishing statements worldwide over the Internet,
renders these last two factors of major importance.30 2
294. Id. at 298.
295. Burger King Corporation v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at 475; cf. Sinatra v. National Enquirer, Inc., 854
F.2d 1191, 1195 (9th Cir. 1988) (recognizing that the analysis for "purposeful availment" examines whether
a defendant's contacts with the forum state are a result of her own actions or solely attributable to actions by
the plaintiff). The Ninth Circuit goes on to announce that its decisions have modified the purposeful availment
analysis to permit 'the exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant whose only 'contact' with the forum is the
'purposeful direction' of a foreign act having effect in the forum state." Id. (quoting Haisten v. Grass Valley
Medical Reimbursement Fund, Ltd., 784 F.2d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir. 1986)).
296. Burger King Corporation v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at 476.
297. Id. at 476.
298. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. at 112.
299. Id. at 113.
300. Id. at 113.
301. Id. at 115.
302. See supra Parts I-I (discussing the ability of almost anyone to publish using the Internet).
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3. Expansive Readings in the Defamation Arena
A line of cases dealing with libel and defamation has developed over recent
years giving a broad interpretation to the traditional cases 03 The cases have
focused on the place where the effects of the harm from defamation were felt;
304
even where the statement was not aimed at a particular locale, some of these cases
have stated that when one publishes a false statement about another, that person
can infer the bulk of the harm will be felt where the defamed resides. Therefore,
the defamer can reasonably anticipate being called to answer for the act in the
forum of the plaintiff.305 This has been the case even where the plaintiff had
almost no reputation prior to the statement?06
In Calder v. Jones (Calder),307 a California plaintiff sued Florida defendants,
an editor and a reporter of the National Enquirer.308 The U.S. Supreme Court held
that jurisdiction was proper because the alleged harm was "intentionally directed
at a California resident."309 The Court stated it was irrelevant that the activities
causing the harm were outside the State since the cause of action arose out of
303. See infra note 313-18 and accompanying text (discussing the cases following Calder v. Jones 465
U.S. 783 (1984)).
304. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783,789 (1984) (establishing that the fact that the act causing effects
in state were committed out of state does not prevent the State from asserting jurisdiction over a suit arising
out of those effects). The Calder Court referred to the case of World-Wide for support of the doctrine that if
defendants purposefully direct their activities to the forum state, they are liable for actions arising out of the
effects of their activities felt in the forum state. Id. The Court rejected defendants' distinction from World-Wide
on the basis that the defendants in this case had no economic stake in sales to another state. Id. Rather, the
Court stressed that jurisdiction was still proper because the intentional and tortious nature of their acts were
directed towards the state. Id. Note that later courts focused on the direction of the activities towards the
resident. See infra note 317.
305. See supra note 317 (setting forth this proposition); icf. Buckley v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 762 F. Supp.
430, 437-39 (D.N.H. 1991) (taking this proposition one step further). This district court confirmed Calder v.
Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) as holding that when defendants direct their actions at a resident of the forum State,
it can be reasonably inferred that they intended the harm to be felt in the state where the resident had an
established reputation. Id. The court went further in recognizing that although none of the parties to the suit
have any real connection to the forum state, it does not mean that the plaintiff did not suffer injury to his
reputation in the forum state. Id. The court went on to state that the fact that the ."brunt of injury' in Hugel and
Calder occurred in the forum state.. .were factors coincidental to the plaintiff's residence in the forum state."
Id. Elaborating, the court emphasized that the defendant's allegedly tortious act was aimed specifically at the
plaintiff, and that with'defamation the conduct, i.e. the publication, occurs wherever the libel was distributed.
Id. The court concluded by holding that all the defendants who had a direct part in writing and publishing the
defamatory matter must reasonably anticipate being called into court in an action for libel wherever injury to
the targeted plaintiff can be expected to occur. Id
306. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. at 777 (explaining that the libel may create a negative
reputation in ajurisdiction where the plaintiff's prior reputation was, "however small, at least unblemished").
307. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
308. See generally Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (setting forth the involved parties).
309. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. at 790. The Court alluded to this being a case covered by specific
jurisdiction when it noted that lack of contacts will not defeat jurisdiction that is otherwise proper. Id. at 788.
It further added that the plaintiff was the focus of the defendant's activities (not the state) out of which the suit
arose. Id.
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those effects felt in the forum state.3t0The Court emphasized that it was not
relying on the defendant's visits or phone calls to the State, since the California
courts have approved the "effects" test.3 Expansive readings of this case have
arisen due to the unclear meaning of "intentionally directed at a California
resident. '1
One of the first cases to interpret Calder expansively was Hugel v. McNell.
313
This case involved libelous statements about a New Hampshire resident provided
by a resident of another state to the Washington Post, which disseminated it all
over the country.3 4 The court applied Calder as the authority for determining
personal jurisdiction in defamation suits.315 The court emphasized that the defen-
dant's actions were aimed toward a New Hampshire resident; that he knew it
would have a devastating effect on the plaintiff; and thus it can be fairly inferred
that he intended the brunt of the injury to be felt in New Hampshire where the
plaintiff had established a reputation316
Several federal district, as well as federal circuit courts, have likewise sub-
scribed to a broad interpretation of the Calder case.3 17 However, several federal
310. See id. at 789 (announcing that jurisdiction is proper based on the effects of Florida conduct in
California, i.e. harm to the plaintiff's reputation). The Court emphasized that they were not relying the
defendant's visits or phone calls to California, since the California Courts have approved of the "effects" test.
Id. at 787.
311. Id. at 787.
312. See infra notes 3 16-17 and accompanying text (illustrating applications of the phrase to other cases).
313. Hugel v. McNell, 886 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989).
314. See id. at 2 (setting forth the facts of the case).
315. See Id. at 5 (adopting Calder as the precedent for the "intentional" tort of defamation). The court
stated that the intentional actions of making defamatory statements to a third party, were aimed at the forum;
the defendant knew it was likely to have a terrible effect on the plaintiff; and he knew that the brunt of the
injury would be felt by the plaintiff in his state of residence. Id. The court emphasized in Calder that knowledge
that the major impact of the injury would be felt in the forum state constitutes purposeful availment or a
substantial contact for personal jurisdiction purposes. Id.
316. See id. at 4 (citing the traditional cases of World-Wide Volkswagen, Burger King, Asahi, and Calder
as support for the court's conclusion that directing actions towards a New Hampshire resident, with knowledge
that it will have a devastating effect, leads to inference that he intended the injury to be felt in New Hampshire,
where the plaintiff had established a reputation). Id. Note that in the court's application of Calder to the facts
of the case at bar, the court specified that by targeting his actions at the plaintiff, it could be inferred that the
defendant intended to harm the plaintiff where he resided and had a reputation. Id. The court seems to be
emphasizing that it is the direction of the harm to the plaintiff, rather than to the forum that is significant; New
Hampshire is the proper place for the suit by virtue of its resident, the plaintiff. Id. at 4-6. Note that in regard
to suing the defendant in a forum where the plaintiff has an established reputation, some cases have emphasized
that a libel victim's reputation may suffer harm in a place, where, up to the events giving rise to the case, he
was anonymous. See e.g., Keeton v. Hustler, 465 U.S. at, 777 (proclaiming that the libel may create a negative
reputation in ajurisdiction where the plaintiff's prior reputation was, "however small, at least unblemished").
The Court further emphasized the state's interest in protecting its citizens from the deception that results from
exposure to false statements of fact. Id. at 776.
317. See Lex Computer & Management Corp. v. Eslinger & Pelton, P.C., CBS, Inc., 676 F.Supp. 399,
404 (1987) (stating that minimum contacts are established when defendants purposefully direct their activities
to residents of the forum State). The court explained that by sending defamatory letters to customers of a New
Hampshire corporation, the defendants purposefully directed their activities to the New Hampshire corporation,
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courts maintain that Calder is not to be interpreted as an exception to the rule that
defendants must purposefully avail themselves of opportunities in the forum
State, stressing that absent some purposeful availment or direction to the forum
state, the due process prong of the personal jurisdiction analysis will not be
and thus there are sufficient minimum contacts to establish jurisdiction based on the "effects" of their conduct.
Id. at 404. The court recognized Calder as a case where the California Court could bring in a Florida defendant
that had no independent contacts with the forum state. Id. at 404. Applying the logic of Calder, the court
explained that if the defendant sent defamatory letters to plaintiff's customers, it should have anticipated the
harm to plaintiff's business; to the extent that the letters harmed plaintiff's business and the damage occurred
in New Hampshire, the defendant had fair warning. Id. at 405. See Caruth v. International Psychoanalytical
Ass'n, 59 F.3d at 127 (setting forth the three part test used by the Ninth Circuit to show when specific
jurisdiction is appropriate: "(1)Te nonresident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or consummate
some transaction with the forum or resident thereof...; (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates
to the defendant's forum- related activities; and (3) the exercise of'jurisdiction must...be reasonable."). When
the cause of action is based in tort, the purposeful availment prong is analyzed under the "effects" test. Id. at
128. The case, involving a claim of denial of status based on age discrimination, found the requirements for
purposeful availment were met: the defendant's decision was directed at a California resident, the defendant
knew that any harm suffered would be by the plaintiff in the state in which she resides. Id. The third part of
the test, i.e. reasonableness, is presumed when purposeful availment is established, with the burden on the
defendant to rebut the presumption. Id. The defendant failed to establish that jurisdiction would be
unreasonable. Id. at 129. See Far West Capital Inc. v. Towne, 46 F.3d at 1077 (citing Burt v. Board of Regents,
757 F.2d 242, 244-45 for the proposition that "no due process notions of fairness are violated by requiring one
who intentionally libels another to answer for the truth of his statements in any state where the libel causes
harm to the victim."). The Tenth Circuit distinguished use of the 'effects' test for business torts where courts
often emphasize a defendant's contacts with the forum state that are independent from those established by way
of the intentional tort. Id. at 1078. See also Sinatra v. National Enquirer, Inc., 854 F.2d at 1195, (citing Haisten
v. Grass Valley Medical Reimbursement Fund, Ltd., 784 F.2d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir. 1986) for the proposition
that decisions of the Ninth Circuit have interpreted Calder and Burger King as modifying the analysis for
purposeful availment to permit "the exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant whose only 'contact' with the
forum is the 'purposeful direction' of a foreign act having effect in the forum state."); Laykin v. McFall, 830
S.W.2d 266, 276 (Tex. 1992) (Bryan Poff, Jr., dissenting) (interpreting Calder as permitting jurisdiction since
the defendants knew the article would injure the plaintiff and that the injury would be felt most where she lived
and worked). The dissent, citing Calder for support, notes that the Supreme Court has made clear that when
a defendant intentionally inflicts injury in the forum state, it is unnecessary to consider the defendant's other
contacts with the forum. Id. at 276. See also Coblentz GMC/Freightliner, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 724
F.Supp. 1364, 1369 (M.D. Ala. 1989) ("[When the origin of a deliberate, nonfortuitous tort is in one state...and
the intended injury to a recognized victim is in another state, the tortfeasor has affirmatively established
minimum contacts with the state in which the injury occurred.. ."); Carteret Say. Bank v. Shushan, 954 F.2d
141, 148 (3rd Cir. 1992) (affirming that with the effects test, a court may exercise jurisdiction over a defendant
whose acts outside the forum cause an effect upon the plaintiff in the forum state); Pilot Air Freight Corp. v.
Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., No. CIV.A.91-4680, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9307, at *I I(E.D. Pa. July 2, 1992)
(finding jurisdiction proper since defendant knew the defamatory article would effect the resident plaintiff);
Shaw v. North Am. Title Co., 876 P.2d 1291, 1300 (Haw. 1994) (holding that allegations of intentional torts
satisfy due process).
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satisfied.318 The manner in which a court interprets Calder will determine the
outcome of defamation suits arising from Internet communications? 9
4. Personal Jurisdiction for Defamation via the Internet
a. Minimum Contacts
Provided jurisdiction is not being sought in a state such as New York or
Georgia, satisfaction of a state's long arm statute should not be an issue.32 Thus,
the constitutional requirement of minimum contacts is the most integral part of
the analysis.
Where a court seeks specific jurisdiction over a non-consenting, foreign
defendant, it is deemed that the defendant had "fair warning" if the defendant
"purposefully directed" his activities at residents of the forum state, and the cause
of action results from purported injuries arising out of or relating to those
activities.32' Since specific jurisdiction is usually soughtin defamation suits, it is
necessary to determine what constitutes "purposeful direction" or "purposeful
availment" by a defendant in the Internet community? 
22
Again, the Internet contains no geographic boundaries? 3z When a message
is posted on a newsgroup, transmitted via e-mail or published as or on a Web
page, it is not accomplished from a geographic locationY24 Though a Web page
exists on a hard drive of a computer in a physical location, it can be retrieved and
viewed throughout the world and thus cannot be considered "located" only in a
particular state.32s Furthermore, just because the computer on which the Web page
is housed sits in a particular location does not mean that the author is necessarily
in that location or even knows the geographic location of the computer housing
the page. 26 For example, a page may be authored in California, while the
318. See Wallace v. Herron, 778 F.2d 391, 395 (7th Cir. 1985) (rejecting interpretation of Calder as
creating an exception to rule that defendants must purposefully avail themselves of opportunities in the forum
state); Southmark Corp. v. Life Investors, Inc., 851 F.2d 763, 773 (5th Cir. 1988) (maintaining that purposeful
direction is necessary and rejecting the broad interpretation of Calder); Green v. USF&G Corp., 772 F.Supp
1258, 1262 (S.D. Fla. 1991) ("lIt would seem to vitiate the two part approach to jurisdiction to hold that in
every case where a tort has occurred in the state, the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process.")
319. See infra Part IV(A)(4)(a) (applying Calder to the Internet).
320. See supra note 274 and accompanying text (providing that the Long Arm statutes for New York
and Georgia do not permit jurisdiction for a cause of action based solely on defamation).
321. See supra notes 282-84 (explaining that specific, rather than general, jurisdiction is proper in
defamation cases, and providing the basis for specific jurisdiction).
322. See supra note 282 and accompanying text (setting forth that when the court seeks specific
jurisdiction, a defendant has fair warning if he purposefully directed his activities at forum residents, out of
which arose injuries giving rise to a cause of action).
323. See supra Parts 1-11 (examining the Internet).
324. Id.
325. Kaplinsky, supra note 94.
326. Id.
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computer which houses the file is located in New Jersey.327 Likewise, when a
message is posted to a newsgroup or sent as an e-mail, the author need not be in
the same location as the machine housing the file, and the author may again not
know where the newsgroup or the recipient of the e-mail is located.3 28 The
corollary is that the user receiving the information or accessing the WWW page
need not and often times cannot know the physical location of that file or its
author.329
It is generally recognized that a letter mailed to a geographic location or a
phone call into a state constitutes purposeful direction since the nature of postal
address infers knowledge of the recipient's residence as does an area code in a
long distance phone call.330 Following that logic, it is arguable that since an e-mail
message does not require a geographic address to reach its recipient, 331 a sender
unaware of the physical location of the recipient could not purposefully direct
activities into the forum state. For example, it is not evident from the Internet
address of Joe@doe.com that Joe resides in Wisconsin. The same is true of a
newsgroup. A user making a statement on a newsgroup has no idea as to the
geographic location of the computer housing the newsgroup? 32 However, is it
really fair to apply standards used in the physical world for determining pur-
poseful availment to a medium with no geographic boundaries? Should know-
ledge of a physical locale or area code of a recipient be the determining factor?
After all, a sender purposefully sends e-mail or posts to a newsgroup. 333 Further-
more, Usenet and many e-mail providers warn users prior to posting that their
message will be posted to thousands of computer systems worldwide, which
shows that these users anticipate their message will be directed to locations
worldwide.334
In Burger King v. Rudzewicz, the court observed that it is an unavoidable fact
of modem life that a considerable amount of business is transacted completely by
mail and wire communication across state lines.335 What is inescapable in today's
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. See supra note 317 (discussing Lex Computer & Management Corp. v. Eslinger & Pelton, P.C.,
676 F.Supp. 399, 404 (D.N.H. 1987)); Dion v. Kiev, 566 F.Supp. 1387, 1390 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (exercising
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant on the basis of a single telephone call into the forum state).
331. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (describing e-mail and noting that users have electronic,
rather than geographic, addresses.
332. Kaplinsky, supra note 94.
333. Users posting to a newsgroup or sending an e-mail message, go through the act of typing their
message, and actively decide to send their message.
334. See USENET Posting Tips, supra note 47. Netcruiser is software owned by Netcom, one of the
largest U.S. providers of Internet conductivity. Kaplinsky, supra note 94. Following the warning that
communications will be posted to computers all over the world, the sender is provided a choice, designated
"yes" if they want to complete the communication and "no" to cancel See USENETPosting Tips, supra note
47. Other software provide similar warnings. Kaplinsky, supra note 94.
335. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,476 (1985).
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modem world is that mass communications among individuals as well as business
transactions are regularly conducted through the Internet, especially e-mail. The
only difference between communications of the past and those of the electronic
present is the latter transaction lacks a physical piece of paper marked with a geo-
graphic location. The activity is the same; a person still writes a message to a
single or countless individuals, and that person still makes a conscious decision
to send the message by the physical act of pressing a button. The distinction lies
in directing the message to an Internet, rather than a geographic, address.
It may be viewed that "purposeful direction" toward a forum is lacking when
a user downloads a Web page or logs on to a newsgroup since the communication
is reached by the unilateral activity of the recipient.336 However, this ignores the
knowledge and acts of the publisher. A publisher posts a message to a newsgroup
or publishes a Web page with the expectation that it will'be read by countless
individuals; it is far from merely fortuitous that a user will come across the com-
munication.337 Though an author may have the desire that only users in a
particular location view the message, the expectation is users will ignore this
desire.33 For example, just because a particular Web page states that only users
in California should continue to view that page, the author does not have a
realistic expectation that recipients other than Californians will not view the
page. 39
Someone publishing on the Internet does so with the knowledge that it is a
publication to the world. Thus he is purposefully directing his activities to a
worldwide audience when he communicates on the Intemetm Arguing there is
no purposeful direction since the publication is not directed at a particular
geographic location focuses on the form rather than the substance of the act.
Furthermore, it is oxymoronic to compare publishing in the Internet community
to publishing in the geographic world when the Internet is not comprised of
geographic boundaries.34t
336. See supra notes 293 and accompanying text (discussing World-Wide). In World-Wide, the Court
noted that the car making its way to Oklahoma was the unilateral activity of the purchaser, and thus does not
establish minimum contacts between the defendantand the forum State. World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). Likewise, it is arguable that a user engages in a unilateral activity when receiving
communications from the Internet.
337. See supra note 334 (discussing the warning displayed prior to posting to USENET or sending an
e-mail message).
338. See supra note 334 (providing that communicators are forewarned that their statements will be
transmitted worldwide). It follows that communicators cannot expect only users in certain locations to receive
to their statements. Kaplinsky, supra note 94.
339. Since technology does not bar a non-Californian from viewing the page, the creator of the page has
to rely on other users' self censorship. This is not a realistic expectation.
340. See supra note 47, 334 and accompanying text (discussing the warning displayed prior to posting
to USENET or sending an e-mail message).
341. See e.g. SurfRider, CAL. L. Bus., July 8, 1996 at 12 (recognizing the Internet knows no geographic
boundaries).
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If courts follow the "effects test" as set forth in the cases expanding on
Calder, persons making defamatory statements on the Internet, could find them-
selves subject to the jurisdiction of any state in the United States in which they
know the communication can be accessed, including the plaintiff's resident state.
Since users know their statements can be accessed worldwide, one can infer they
know their communication can be accessed in every state and country connected
to the Internet.342 For instance, if Joe sends out communication defaming Robert
Smith, according to some jurisdictions, Joe knows that any harm suffered by
Robert will be in his resident state, thus Joe had fair warning he could be subject
to that state's jurisdiction.3 43
Publishing statements on the Internet by newsgroup or WWW is analogous
to injecting a product into the stream of commerce. World-Wide Volkswagen
states if the sale of a manufacturer's product arises from its efforts to directly or
indirectly serve the market in other states, it is reasonable to subject it to juris-
diction in a state where injury results from its product.345 The same can be said for
communications on the Internet. Authors do not provide their communications
to only those who request them. Therefore, it is not merely foreseeable their com-
munications will be published worldwide.346 Rather, authors send their communi-
cations to the world; the communications do not merely sit idle in the author's
home state awaiting the unilateral activity of an audience.M7 When users post to
a newsgroup, they are fully aware of this since a message to the extent of "are you
sure you want to post your message to thousands of computer systems around the
world?" is offered. 348 Authors have a choice at this point to directly inject their
communication into the global stream of communications 4 9 Just as a state acts
within constitutional limits when it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation
"that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that
342. See supra note 47, 344 and accompanying text (discussing the warning displayed prior to posting
to USENET or sending an e-mail message). As of 1994, 146 countries were connected to the Internet. Rosalind
Resnick, supra note 25, at Al.
343. See supra notes 316-17 and accompanying text (discussing cases subscribing to this view).
344. See Colin Stretch, Internet Technology & Personal Jurisdiction, (visited Sept. 29, 1996)
<http../roscoe.law.harvard.edu/courses/tec...course/sessionsjurisdictiornl/stretch.htm> (recognizing that the
"stream of commerce" theory is vitally important in determining whether Internet communications subjects
users to liability in every state).
345. World-Wide Volkswagen Corporation v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
346. See id. at 298 (providing foreseeability of a product ending up outside the selling area of dealer is
not sufficient for due process).
347. See supra note 326 and accompanying text (explaining that the computer hosting an author's
communication may not even be located in his geographic state); see also ACLU v. Reno, 929 F.Supp. 824,
878 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (contrasting the Internet from other media, since there is not technological way to limit
the geographic scope of one's communications on the Internet).
348. See supra note 47, 344 and accompanying text (discussing the warning displayed prior to posting
to USENET or sending an e-mail message).
349. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F.Supp. at 844 (providing once a communication is put on the Internet,
the publisher cannot prevent it from entering any community).
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they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State,"350 it follows that a state
would not exceed its powers under the constitution by asserting jurisdiction over
publishers delivering their communications into the stream of global com-
munications when they know that thousands of computer systems around the
world will receive the message.
b. Reasonableness-the Safety Net?
The reasonableness factors set out in World-Wide could very likely prevent
a court from exercising jurisdiction over a foreign defendant as illustrated in
Asahi.35t Asahi stressed the unique burdens involved when dealing with a foreign
defendant such as the burden of traveling internationally and being tried in a
foreign judicial system 52 This will be an important consideration when deter-
mining whether to subject a foreigner to personal jurisdiction in the United States
for his defamatory statements published on the Internet.
5. Hypothetical Situations Involving the Internet
Refer back to the example regarding Professor Robins and Professor Jay.353
Assume the statement is "Professor Robins' only real interest is chasing chicks."
Assume Professor Jay resides in England and Professor Robins resides in
California where he would like to bring suit. About 150 people accessed the Web
page from the United States, as compared to 400 combined in other countries.
While it is possible to determine the particular states from where the accesses
came, it is difficult.35 4 Assume that 120 of the locations were ascertainable and
that seven people in California accessed the Web page. Professor Robins has
never been to California and has no business ties there. Will the California courts
assert jurisdiction over Professor Robins? Under a traditional minimum contacts
analysis the court will look'to whether Professor Jay purposefully directed his
communications to California.3 55 If the court views access to the page as the
unilateral activity of those who downloaded the page, and thus as lacking pur-
poseful direction into the forum, then the court most likely would not assert per-
350. World-Wide Volkswagen Corporation v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,298 (1980).
351. See supra notes 299-301 and accompanying text (illustrating the Asahi court's application of the
World-Wide factors).
352. See supra note 300 and accompanying text.
353. See supra Part IV(A)(6) (setting forth this hypothetical).
354. The person that monitors the computer hosting the page can go into the logue, and see which
computers accessed the page. Kaplinsky, supra note 27. The monitor would have to trace it back. Id. For
instance, a person could see that someone from AOL accessed, but not where that computer was located. Id.
Someone from AOL could presumably determine the locations of the computers which accessed the page. Id.
355. See supra Part IV(B)(2) (discussing requirements for a traditional minimum contacts analysis).
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sonal jurisdiction over Professor Jay.356 On the other hand if the court recognizes
Professor Jay knew at the time he published the WWW page that it would be sent
to thousands of computer systems all over the world where people could view it,
then the argument is Professor Jay expected some of these systems to be located
in California. Thus, his page was not merely sitting on his personal computer in
England, nor necessarily being hosted on a computer located in England. Rather,
he purposefully directed his WWW page to the world at large, where it is
unreasonable to expect that someone in California would not receive the
publication. If purposeful direction is established, and since the communication
was the source of harm to Professor Robins, minimum contacts may well be
established.5 7 However, since Professor Jay is from another country, the reason-
ableness of bringing him into a foreign country to defend himself in a foreign
judicial system, may prompt the court to deny personal jurisdiction over him.3 58
If the court follows the "effects test", as California does, then Professor
Robins would most surely satisfy the constitutional requirement of minimum
contacts.359 Since Professor Robins was the intended victim of the libelous WWW
page, the defendant knew that any harm the plaintiff suffered would be in the
state in which he resides, providing fair warning that he could be brought into the
California courts.360 The states following the effects test as the analysis for pur-
poseful availment provide that reasonableness is presumed when this is estab-
lished, thus leaving the burden on the defendant to rebut the presumption.36' In
the case of a foreign defendant, it is very likely that the presumption of rea-
sonableness can be rebutted by the fact that he resides in a foreign country.3 62
Thus, in this hypothetical, it is highly probable that the court would not assert
personal jurisdiction. This decision may be effected if the plaintiff was trying to
recover under the single publication rule for damage to his reputation from all the
WVWTW page accesses in the United States, as well as other countries.363
356. See supra note 293 and accompanying text (discussing World-Wide Volkswagen and the effect of
a unilateral activity).
357. See supra notes 291-94 and accompanying text (examining World-Wide Volkswagen as providing
when there is purposeful direction, jurisdiction is proper in the states where injury results from the manu-
facturer's product.
358. See supra notes 298-99 (discussing Asahi, where although products were injected into the stream
of commerce, the unreasonableness of forcing foreigners to defend themselves in a foreign forum outweighed
this).
359. See supra notes 303-19 and accompanying text (analyzing the "effects" test).
360. See supra notes 315-17 and accompanying text (providing cases interpreting Calder as standing
for this proposition); see also note 316 and accompanying text (setting forth cases where courts exercised
jurisdiction although plaintiff did not reside there, based on the effects to plaintiff's reputation there).
361. See supra note 316.
362. See supra notes 298-302.
363. See supra note 151-54 (discussing Keeton v. Hustler and the Single Publication rule).
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Additionally the other factors stated in World-Wide may affect the balance
otherwise.3 4
V. CONCLUSION
It is not unrealistic that private individuals may find themselves liable and
subject to the jurisdiction of a foreign country for their defamatory Internet com-
munications.165 This is especially so in England where the libel laws favor the
plaintiff,36 and in the United States if the forum state subscribes to the "effects"
test367 or views Internet communications as purposeful injections into the stream
of global communications? 68 In determining how to apply current U.S. and
English jurisdiction law to the Internet, recognition of the nature of the medium
is crucial.
Application of a doctrine based on geographic territory concepts to a world
without geographic parameters may prove unworkable.369 The Internet is growing
into a predominant medium for global communication.370 It is unique and unlike
any other media form.3 7' Applying a doctrine developed without knowledge or
understanding of this new and ever growing technology is problematic.372 In the
United States, it is contradictory to apply a doctrine whereby knowledge of a
geographic postal address or area code can control the outcome of a suit, to
communications purposefully directed to a world audience, yet utilizing computer
addresses. In England, there exists the potential for serious consequences to the
364. See supra note 292 and accompanying text (discussing the World-Wide Volkswagen factors).
365. See supra Parts IV(A)(6), (B)(4)-(5) (setting forth applications of U.S. and English jurisdictional
law to the Internet).
366. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (providing the presumptions existing in favor of a
plaintiff bringing suit for libel in England).
367. See supra notes 308-18 and accompanying text (discussing Calder and various interpretations
applied).
368. See supra notes 344-50 and accompanying text (comparing Internet communications to injecting
goods into the stream of commerce).
369. See Colin Stretch, Internet Technology and Personal Jurisdiction, supra note 344 (recognizing that
"territorial jurisdiction" may be irrelevant to a world not reliant on geographic borders); see also Susan Ross,
supra note 341, at 12 (providing that the Internet knows no boundaries). Susan Ross is an attorney, engineer
and founder of InterLegal Services, Inc. Id. See Guylyn R. Cummins, Cyberspace Censorship Threatens Us
All, GRAY, CARY, WYARE FREIDENRICH Q., Spring/Summer 1996, at 5 (discussing the context of free speech,
the problem of applying an old doctrine to an unocomprehended 21st century technology).
370. See ACLU v. Reno (visited Sept. 29, 1996) <http://lawlinks.com/flacom/recent/aclreno.html>,
(commenting on the unanimous recognition by a three judge panel of a Federal District Court that the Internet
communication, unlike the broadcast media, is two-way and global); ACLU v. Reno, 929 F.Supp 824, 883
(E.D. Pa. 1996) (referring to Internet as " never-ending worldwide communication").
371. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F.Supp. at 844 (recognizing the Internet as a unique form of global communi-
cation).
372. See also Cummins, supra note 369 at 5 (addressing the problem of applying old laws to a
technology not understood by lawmakers).
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English legal system as a result of Internet libel cases due to the ease of bringing
libel suits in England.373
A. Proposals
1. New Laws
It is arguable that new laws are needed to adapt to this new medium of global
communications technology. However, since the Internet knows no global
boundaries, different regulations from various countries may only add to the
confusion.374 Additionally, one should be wary of too much government inter-
vention into the most free mode of mass communications yet?75 An unwanted
consequence would be the stifling of the existing free exchange of ideas.
376
Finally, the technical difficulty of government intervention with the Internet
should be considered.3"
2. Ignorance Is No Excuse
It is fair to say that those communicating via the Internet realize that they can
communicate worldwide. Furthermore, Internet communicators using e-mail or
participating in newsgroups know before they post their communication that it
will be sent out worldwide.3 78 Armed with this knowledge, they should not be
permitted to claim ignorance when their communication enters the global stream
of communication. Rather, they should be held legally responsible for their
actions. Perhaps the defamation laws of every country should appear on Internet
users' screens when they log on. Then users cannot claim ignorance of the law
regarding defamation worldwide.
373. See Martin Bright, Caught in the Net, THE GUARD!AN (Manchester), Apr. 25, 1996, at TIO
(reporting the comments of London media lawyer, Nick Braithwaite). Braithwaite believes Internet libel cases
could have considerable effect on the British court system since plaintiff's will choose countries, such as
England, which have repressive libel laws. Id.
374. About half of all Internet communications come from outside the United States. ACLU v. Reno,
929 F.Supp. at 883.
375. See id. at *204 (recognizing that the Internet is the most "participatory form of mass speech yet
developed" and that it "deserves the highest protection from governmental intrusion" ).
376. See generally id. (addressing the importance of free speech on the Internet).
377. See generally id. (discussing the technological nature of the Internet). It is technologically infeasible
for Internet speakers to limit the geographic scope of their communications, as it is for government screening.
Id. at 878. See Why the Net Should Grow Up, ECONOMIST, Oct. 19-25, 1995 at 17 (recognizing that policing
the Internet is more difficult than television since the Internet transmits content worldwide).
378. See supra note 348 and accompanying text (discussing the knowledge Internet communicators
possess regarding the worldwide distribution of their communications).
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3. Contract
Contracts between users and Internet access providers could delegate
responsibility for Internet defamations. These could be on a one time basis when
the user signs up with the access provider, or in the form of an on-line contract
every time a user logs on. This way, Internet users would be fully informed as to
defamation law, where and when they can be subject to liability, and have the
choice of taking the risk with their communications. Since the Internet is global,
perhaps an international organization composed of Internet access providers could
draft a uniform contract for all Internet users to sign, setting forth the law
governing defamatory Internet communication and the manner and location in
which disputes will be resolved.
4. Equal Access
With traditional forms of communications, such as broadcast and newspaper,
the private individual did not have the opportunity to defend themselves to the
public. 79 With the Internet, however everyone has equal access to communicate
with very little cost involved. Therefore, perhaps individuals should be left to
defend themselves in the same way they were defamed, rather than using the
judicial system. 380 Furthermore, at least when dealing with private individuals,
it seems that a law suit may not be worth the cost, since not all individuals have
deep pockets.38? The better remedy is for defamed to go on-line and fight back
themselves. Alternatively, maybe a global Internet policy first giving the defamer
the opportunity to cure the harm in the same manner he caused it, before jumping
to the courts is an option.
Regardless of the solution, one thing is clear. Guidelines for operating on-line
are necessary so individuals are aware of when and where they will be legally
responsible for their actions. Internet communication is the most free form of
mass communication yet. At the beginning of its popularity, flame wars, whereby
users launched personal attacks at each other and all had equal access to defend
themselves, were common.3 82 Now that defamation lawsuits have entered the
379. See generally ACLU v. Reno, 929 F.Supp. at 877 (recognizing that the Internet presents identical
low barriers to entry for all users and that the medium "creates a relative parity among speakers").
380. See Resnick, supra note 25 (providing the thoughts of Mr. Godwin of the Electronic Frontier
Foundation). The better remedy for defamed persons is to get on-line and "correct the record." Id.
381. See id. (providing the thoughts of Mr. Godwin of the Electronic Frontier Foundation). Mr. Godwin
states that although there is greater potential for libel suits from Internet communications, the number of suits
actually filed will be limited since most defendants will be individuals, rather than publishers with deep
pockets. Id.
382. See Bright, supra note 373 (noting that newsgroup participants, often involved in flame wars, must
now be more careful in light of the recent Internet libel suits); see also Resnick, supra note 25 (recognizing
that casual flame wars on the Internet provide more libel causes of action than other forms of media).
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world of Internet communications, users will have to change the freedom with
which they speak. Without clear guidelines, these users are left to communicate
at their own risk.
Tara Blake Garfnkel3 4
383. See id. (providing the comments of Mr. Sanford, attorney for Meeks in the Internet libel suit of
Suarez Corp. Industries v. Brock N. Meeks, 267513 (Ct. of Common Pleas, Cuyahoga Co'.)). With the rise of
libel suits from Internet communications, people will be more aware of the potential for legal liability and be
more careful about what they write. Id.
384. B.A., Brandeis University, 1989; J.D.,_University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be
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